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DOOMED TO BE VIOLATED ?
THE U.S.-ISRAELI CLANDESTINE END-USER AGREEMENT AND THE
SECOND LEBANON WAR: LESSONS FOR THE CONVENTION ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
EITAN BARAK*
Israel's extensive cluster munitions (CMs) use in the 2006 Second Lebanon War
served as a major impetus for the 2008 Convention on CMs (CCM). It also led to
an extensive U.S.-Israeli diplomatic entanglement over Israel's supposed
violations of U.S. legislation, specifically the 1976 classified Bilateral End-User
Agreement detailing Israel's use of US.-made CMs. The Article first tracks the
Agreement's inception and the diplomatic crises caused by Israel's alleged breach
since then. The second section provides a detail account of the 2006 crisis while
the third analyzes if US. legislation was violated The Article concludes, using a
flexible interpretation, that in effect US. legislation was not violated and argues
that given its out-dated stipulations the Agreement was doomed to be violated
under a formal interpretation. More importantly, given the restrictions imposed on
Israel by the Agreement, this case provides a unique opportunity to assess the
rationale behind the refusal of CCM supporters to accept anything but a total ban
on CMs.
Only after the war did we, Amir [Amir Peretz, Israel's 2006 Wartime Minister of
Defense] and I, first learn about the use of cluster bombs . . . the responsible
echelons in the IDF [Israel Defense Force] refused to provide me with the maps
[of the strike locations]. They wanted to hide the fact that we had fired this
problematic weapon . .. without any higher authorization and in an uncontrolled
manner, although they were old munitions which the Americans had provided us
following assurance that we would use it only in case our very survival was at
stake.'
* Lecturer (U.S. Assistant Professor), Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. I am indebted to John Borrie, Guy Harpaz, Milton Leitenberg, Richard Moyes, Eric
Prokosch, Jullian Perry Robinson, Robbie Sabel, and Dan Yakir for their comments and suggestions.
Special thanks are due to Brian Rappert, Yael Ronen and Yuval Shany. I also thank participants of the
International Law Forum, the Hebrew University, in which an earlier draft of this article was discussed
in March 2008. I am also grateful to Yaccov Verzberger for sharing his views on specific issues with
me. Last but not least, I am indebted to Lior Avni, Yeela Porat and Roee Ariav for outstanding research
assistance. Any remaining errors are mine alone.
1. See Akiva Eldar, Captured in Conception, HAARETZ, Friday Supplement, July 18, 2008, at 21,
24 (recollection of Hagai Alon, a former political adviser of Peretz).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In summer 2006, amidst intense fighting, accusations appeared in the
international media claiming Israel's use of cluster munitions (CMs) 2 in Lebanon
was illegal.3 Yet the world's outcry was raised in the war's aftermath, with Israel
suddenly finding itself under heavy attack.4
However, while the government's initial formal response stressed that
"strenuous efforts were made to ensure that these [IDF operations] were carried out
in complete accordance with international law, both with regard to method and
weaponry,"' on November 19, 2006 the then IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan
Halutz surprisingly chose a completely different response stating that the use of
cluster bombs often constituted a clear violation of his explicit order not to fire
into populated zones.6
As expected, Halutz's announcement took the Israeli public by surprise and
caused bitterness among Israeli war veterans who felt that they had followed all
orders when firing.7 An artillery officer (reservist) was quoted saying: "Did he
[Halutz] really say that .... We fired not a single rocket on our own initiative. No
one would have ever considered firing at any target without explicit orders to do
so."
The queries over Halutz's statement given its unequivocal connotation (i.e.,
the IDF was an unruly army which did not follow orders) as reflected in the Israeli
press became more frequent and vocal. However, neither the Israeli public nor the
international community was aware that Halutz's admission was made in an
attempt to appease the U.S.; the U.S. State Department had already begun an
2. See generally Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an Instrument on
Cluster Munitions, 12 J. OF CONFLICT AND SEC. L. 447, 450-54 (2007) (defining cluster bombs as
"weapon[s] comprising multiple explosive submunitions [i.e., bomblets] which are dispensed from a
container" and are "munition[s] designed to be dispensed in multiple quantities from a container and to
detonate prior to, on, or after impact.").
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Israeli Cluster Munitions Hit Civilians
in Lebanon (July 24, 2006) (available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/24/isrlpal3798 txt.htm);
Robert Pear, Rally Near White House Protests Violence In Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at A22.
4. See Marvin Kalb & Carol Saivetz, The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006. The Media as a
Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict, 12 THE INT'L J. OF PRESS/POLITICS. 43, 51 (2007) (noting that some
leading U.S. newspapers portrayed Israel as the aggressor).
5. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Behind the Headlines: Legal and Operational
Aspects of the Use of Cluster Bombs (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Legal+and+operational+aspects+of+the+use+of+cluster+b
ombs+5-Sep-2006.htm.
6. See, e.g., Nir Hason & Meron Rapoport, Chief of Staff is to Appoint a Major General to
Inquire into Use of Cluster Rockets, HAARETZ, Nov. 20, 2006, at Al; Yossi Joshua, IDF Fired Cluster
Bombs Contrary to the Chief of Staffs Order, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Nov. 20, 2006, at 2 (referring to
Halutz's announcement, which was reported on November 19 via the major Israeli TV evening news
programs and appeared the day after in daily national newspapers).
7. See, e.g., Meron Rapoport, Peretz's Office Admits 'Irregularities' in Use of Cluster Bombs
During War, HAARETZ, Nov. 21, 2006, at 2.
8. See Meron Rapoport, A Barrage ofAccusations, HAARETZ, Dec. 8, 2006, at B2.
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inquiry into Israel's use of U.S.-made cluster bombs prior to his admission.9
Israel's concern was not due to the seemingly pertinent U.S. legislation: The 1952
U.S.-Israeli Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (hereinafter the 1952
Agreement) under which Israel may employ U.S.-made weapons if they are "'used
solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense . . ."a and the
1976 U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which governs use of U.S.-made
defense equipment and services by foreign nations and under which the U.S. may
stop aid to countries that use U.S. military assistance for purposes other than
"'legitimate self defense."11
On December 16, 1976 a bilateral end-use agreement specifying conditions
for the use of U.S.-made cluster bombs by Israel was concluded between the two
allies. 12 The agreement is so highly classified that even 30 years later the two states
continue to keep its exact terms secret:"[O]ftentimes it [the end use agreement]
gets into rules of engagement for specific countries and those themselves are
usually classified or tightly held by the foreign national government." 13
Today, with the crisis behind us and the participants (the Olmert Government
and the Bush Administration) leaving center stage, it is a good time to explore this
affair within its current context. In December 2008, 94 states signed the
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Oslo, Norway, 14 which prohibits the
9. David S. Cloud, Inquiry Opened Into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006,
at 1.
10. Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the United States of America and
Israel Relating to Mutual Defense Assistance, U.S.-Isr., art. 2, July 1-23, 1952, 1953 U.N.T.S. 2363,
(providing participation in U.N. collective security agreements as a third allowed purpose but not
defining terms such as "internal security," "legitimate self-defense," or "act of aggression") (emphasis
added).
11. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (1976). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2753 (1976)
(outlining presidential and Congressional response options to violations under this act); see RICHARD F.
GRIMMETT, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 30982, U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES
SUPPLIED To FOREIGN RECIPIENTS: RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR USE, (Mar. 14, 2005), CRS 1-4 (providing
a brief overview of the act); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 502,
75 Stat. 424 (authorizing the provision of defense articles and services on a government-to-government
grant basis in provisions virtually identical to those in the AECA).
12. See CONG. REC., 12030 (May 1, 1978), cited in WILLIAM ESPINOSA & LES JANKA, DEFENSE
OR AGGRESSION? U.S. ARMS EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON 16
(American Educational Trust Rep., 1982) (citing a letter dated April 20, 1978 and written by Israel's
Ambassador to the U.S., Simcha Dinitz (1973-79) during the 1978 crisis over the use of U.S.-made
CMs in Lebanon that was later introduced into the Congressional Record by Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. of
California).
13. Sean McCormack, U.S. Dep't. of State Daily Press Briefing (Jan. 29, 2007), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/jan/79467.htm (justification provided by Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs and the State Department spokesperson at the time).
14. ClusterConvention.org, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference (2008),
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages iv/iv signingconferece.html (noting that four states also
ratified the CCM at the same time: The Holy See, Ireland, Norway and Sierra Leone); see generally
ClusterConvention.org, Ratifications and Signatures (2008), http://www.clusterconvention.org/
pages/pages i/i statessigning.html (listing the signatories to the CCM). As of Nov. 1, 2009 103 states
have signed the the Convention from which 24 states have already ratified it. An updated list of
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use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of CMs." The CCM
represents the culmination of the Oslo Process which spearheaded five
international conferences between February 2007 (Oslo, Norway) and May 2008
(Dublin, Ireland).16
In contrast, due to the total ban adopted by the CCM in 2007, several major
countries that stock and/or use CMs, led by the U.S., initiated another multilateral
process. The new process called for the regulation of, rather than a complete ban
of, CMs thorough a series of legally binding restrictions initiated under the
auspices of the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
In the face of international outcries over the absence of any legal restrictions on
CMs, various restrictions were proposed in the (sixth) draft Protocol on CMs; these
were believed to adequately address the need to dramatically minimize the likely
post-conflict harm associated with such weapons. 8
At the time of its extensive use of CMs in the 2006 War, Israel was actually
subject to legal restrictions far more stringent than those proposed by the current
draft protocol ("Draft Protocol"). The source of these restrictions was, however,
quite different: a bilateral end-user agreement (with subsequent assurances and
clarifications)1 9 and not a multilateral agreement.
Ratifications and Signatures is available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)
/67DC5063EB530E02C 12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument).
15. See Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, U.N. Doc.
CCM/77 (May 30, 2008) (will be ratified six months after its ratification by 30 States ratification),
available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/ccm77_english.pdf (comprising
separate articles that refer to assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas, and destruction of
stockpiles) [hereinafter, CCM]; see generally Priya Pillai, Adoption of the Convention on Cluster
Munitions, 12 ASIL Insights (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights081001.cfm (providing a brief
overview of the CCM's provisions).
16. ClusterConvention.org, Calendar of Events, http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/
pages iii /iii calendar.html (last visited September 18, 2009) (indicating the other three conferences
were held at Lima, Peru (May 2007), Vienna, Austria (December 2007), and Wellington, New Zealand
(February 2008) in addition to a large number of regional meetings that were held to promote signing of
the CCM between March 2007 (South East Asia) and November 2008 (Beirut, Lebanon)). For the most
comprehensive and updated overview and analysis of this process see John Borrie, Unacceptable
Harm: A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won (United Nations, 2009.
forthcoming).
17. See United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523; see generally
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C]257180004B]B30?
OpenDocument (referring to the CCW as the Inhumane Weapons Convention and noting that there are
currently 110 parties to the CCW, some of which have not ratified all the protocols, and five
signatories).
18. See Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, Oct. 21, 2009, CCW Doc. CCW/MSP/2009/WP.1.
The draft was presented by Gustavo Ainchil, Chairperson of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) for the consideration of the issue in the 2009 Meeting of the States Parties (Geneva, 12-13 Nov.
2009), item 10 of the provisional agenda, under his personal responsibility available at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF4E78AA321C4B4EC12573CF005D136?Ope
nDocument [hereinafter, Draft Protocol].
19. THOMAS NASH, FORESEEABLE HARM 4 (Richard Moyes ed., Land Mine Action 2006).
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This Article is divided into three parts. Part One briefly sketches the
background of the 1976 Agreement and its history leading up to the 2006 War.
Since Israel used CMs in all of its post 1976 large-scale conflicts (i.e., 1978, 1982,
2006), the Article explores U.S. attempts to strengthen the Agreement following
Israel's first round of CM use in Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon, by adding an
additional, more detailed classified legal instrument. An overview of the sanction
(suspension) imposed on Israel, following its second round of CM use in the 1982
Lebanon War, concludes this part.
In Part Two, the Article focuses on the U.S.-Israel entanglement following
Israel's extensive CM usage in 2006. It begins with an account of the IDF's
unprecedented response to U.S. criticism analyzing the U.S. State Department's
inquiry and the manner in which the Bush Administration managed the crisis by
successfully concluding it despite escalating pressure from Human Rights NGOs
and the international media.
The first two parts provide the background necessary for the Article's main
thrust: an in-depth legal analysis of whether U.S. legislation in general and the
bilateral agreement in particular were violated during the Second Lebanon War.
Furthermore, given the similarity between International Humanitarian Law's (IHL)
requirements and U.S. demands vis-iA-vis Israel, an inquiry into the aggregated
stipulations of all pertinent U.S. instruments addressed by Israel implies
addressing, in part, whether Israel's extensive CM use complies with international
law in general and IHL in particular. This analysis in Part Three suggests that in
applying flexible interpretation, Israel did not likely violate the 1976 Agreement.
In contrast, under formal and strict methods of interpretation, such an agreement,
given its outdated stipulations and clarifications was doomed to be violated. In fact,
had Israel escaped its ever-growing dependency on the U.S., it could have invoked
the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.20
Moreover, the restrictions imposed on Israel by the bilateral end-user
agreement are similar to those introduced in the newly proposed CCW Protocol.
Thus, regardless of the outcome of the U.S. initiative (creating a new CM
protocol), the 2006 Israeli use in the context of the 1976 Agreement provides a
unique opportunity to assess the rationale behind the refusal of CCM supporters to
accept anything less than a complete ban on CMs. Salient conclusions as to the
CCM's importance, beyond the legal issues, close the Article.
II. A HISTORY OF THE 1976 U.S.-MADE CLUSTER AGREEMENT (UP To THE
SECOND LEBANON WAR)
A. Origins of the 1976 US. -Made Cluster Agreement
In the 1950s, Israel began developing an aerial-dropped CM. In fact the first
20. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 459, 470-71 (2004-2005) (discussing the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as
recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
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casualty (March 1954) suffered in EMET 21 resulted from a live CM test and the
improper care of a dud's fuse.22 Yet no mass production line was established at the
time.
In the face of mounting incidents on the Israeli-Egyptian front in the wake of
the 1967 Six Day War, Israel repeatedly requested that the U.S. provide it with the
modem U.S.-made CMs used during the Vietnam War. Its efforts were, however,
to no avail.23 When the intensity of armed incidents reached the level justifying
their formal classification as a War of Attrition, Israel's need for CMs became
24more urgent. Because the U.S. refused to provide Israel with this "sensitive
weapon"-as the U.S. defined CMs-despite its necessity to attack the Egyptian
anti-aircraft batteries that were limiting Israeli Air Force (IAF) freedom of
operation, Israel was left with no choice but to begin master production of modem
CMs. 25 Israel therefore initiated a crash program26 in 1970, which resulted in the
remarkable development of a highly advanced aerial-dropped CM known as Tal-1
(a 5501b bomb containing 279 bomblets).27 However, because the War of Attrition
ended on August 7, 1970, shortly after the first-"highly successful"-use of the
weapon on June 8, 1970 (Operation Baldness 75), this indigenous CM was barely
used in this war.28
While technical problems prevented Israel from mass-producing this weapon,
the mere realization that Israel could establish an indigenous CM manufacturing
industry was sufficient to convince the Nixon Administration to drop its objections
and provide CMs to its ally. The first shipments of U.S.-made CMs (such as the
CBU-7/A, which contains 1200 bomblets) to Israel arrived in the War's aftermath
21. See Munya Mardor (A), RAFAEL 57-160 (1981) for a discussion by EMET's chief
administrator and the founding director of RAFAEL regarding EMET's short history (1952-1958) and
the transformation of EMET (a Hebrew acronym for Division of Research and Planning) into RAFAEL
(a subdivision of the Ministry of Defense, in Hebrew, Armament Development Authority Advanced
Defense Systems Ltd.).
22. See Munya Mardor (B), RAFAEL, in THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT
AND DEFENSE PRODUCTION 1, 26-28 (Nathan Roee ed., 1982) for a detailed description of this incident;
see Mardor (A), RAFAEL, Id, 143-5 (explaining that the bomb was known as Z-15, for the seventh letter
in the Hebrew alphabet).
23. See Danny Shalom, Phantoms Over Cairo - Israeli Air Force In The War Of Attrition (1967-
1970) 838 (Bavir Aviation & Space Publications 2007).
24. See Mardor (A), RAFAEL, supra note 21, at 215-16 (noting that the War of Attrition officially
began in March 1969 and ended in August 1970, although intensive incidents occurred already in late
1967, and that the intensive use of armament, especially aerial arms, resulted in, for example, a ten-fold
jump in some types of ammunition, such as 100kg gravity bombs: 4000 during 1969 to 40,000 in 1970).
25. See Shalom, supra note 23, at 837-38.
26. See Alan Hayman, Bombs and Unguided Rockets: Low-Cost-Ordnance for Aerial Warfare, 41
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (1982), cited in Kevin Danaher, Israel's Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon, 12
J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 48, 51 (1982).
27. See Shalom, supra note 23, at 837 (providing a detailed specification of Tal-I); see Mardor
(B), RAFAEL, supra note 22, at 76 (noting that at that time, this was a remarkable achievement which
even won its development team the 1971 prestigious Israel Defense Prize for exceptional technological
breakthroughs).
28. See Shalom, supra note 23, at 1141.
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and during the 1973 War, additional urgent shipments of CMs were requested and
approved. 29 By 1975, Israel had received approximately 22,000 U.S. CBU units.P
Although Israel used US-made CMs against Palestinian bases in Lebanon
during March-April 1974, the only reported restriction imposed by the U.S. was
that "the weapons not be used against civilian populations."3 1 Even the January
1975 Ford Administration decision to sell 200 Lance cluster warheads missiles
32
(MGM-52) to Israel had no effect on this slack restriction. However, in October
1976, President Ford granted Israel's request for "a small number" of CBU-72 3
that, although listed as CMs, attracted considerable attention because they were in
fact Fuel-Air Explosive [FAE] bombs, referred to as "enhanced blast munitions"
by some experts3 4 but more often as simply "concussion bombs." 35 Interestingly,
under both the CCM and the Draft Protocol, CBU-72s are not considered CMs. 3 6
Concussion bombs disperse an aerosol cloud of fuel that, once ignited, produces a
highly destructive shock wave. Those in the explosion area face being crushed by
the blast or killed by having air sucked out of their lungs due to the vacuum created
by the explosion.37 Because of its potential severe collateral damage and its
devastating impact on combatants, this weapon caused much concern in the
international community, reflected in the 1976 proposal to ban "anti-personnel use
of weapons which for their effects rely exclusively on shock waves in the air."38
29. See Leslie H. Gelb, Arms Aid to Israel May Cost $2-Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1973, at 97
(noting the urgent supply obtained during the 1973 War).
30. See Don Oberdorfer, Cluster Bomb Curbs Sought in Mideast, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1978, at
Al.
31. ADAM ARNON, LAND OF LEBANON 312 (2005) (discussing Israel's CM use in March-April
1974); see Lee Lescaze, U.S. to Give Israel Devastating Bombs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1976, at Bl5
(discussing the loose restrictions prior to December 1976).
32. See CHRISTOPHER CHANT, A COMPENDIUM OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY HARDWARE 501-
2 (Routledge & Kegan Paul Inc.) (1987) (explaining that lance missiles had only cluster warheads
containing 836 bomblets each in their non-nuclear version); John W. Finney, Israel to Receive 200 U.S.
Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1975, at 6 for a discussion of Ford's decision after nearly four years of
Israeli lobbying; YIGAL LEv, ARTILLERY CORPS 143 (1981) for Israeli accounts of their reception;
William Beecher, U.S. Said to Weigh Sending Israel Short-Range Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1971, at 3 for a discussion of Israel's request as early as 1971.
33. See David Binder, President Cancels Israeli Bomb Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1977, at 11; see
also Diplomacy: Time to Meet the Players, TIME, Feb. 21, 1977.
34. See, e.g., Erich Prokosch & Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Antipersonnel Weapons, in 65 WAR OR
HEALTH? A READER 75 (Ilkka Taipale et al., eds., 2002).
35. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Ford Move on New Arms to Israel Is Termed Political, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1976, at 3.
36. Draft Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 2, 2(d)(i) (requiring at least ten "explosive sub-
munitions"); CCM, supra note 15, at art.2, 2(c)(i) (also requiring at least ten "explosive sub-
munitions").
37. For more on the first generation of FAE weapons see, e.g., SIPRI, ANTI-PERSONNEL
WEAPONS 171-175 (1978). For reasons to ban this weapon see, e.g., Ove Bring, Regulating
Conventional Weapons in the Future - Humanitarian Law or Arms Control?, 24 J. OF PEACE
RESEARCH, 275, 278-280 (1987).
38. See International committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons, Annex A. 1, 167 (1976), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
2009 7
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Despite Israel's declaration that the FAE bombs were needed for "destroying
minefields, neutralizing ground-to-air missiles site, and smashing concrete fighter
plane revetments" 39 the Ford Administration sought a concrete commitment that
this weapon, then considered an advanced CM, would not be used against civilians
and some military targets.40 The IDF would thus have to pledge "to drop them only
in certain cases."4 1 On December 5, 1976, Shimon Peres, then Israel's Minister of
Defense, flew to Washington to secure advance weapons, including CMs. 42 On
December 16, 1976 the cited classified end-use agreement was secretly signed.43
Formally, other than the fact that it contains "stipulations and conditions on
the use of CBU's,"44 the agreement's exact terms remain classified.4 5 However,
various U.S. officials have suggested that in addition to the basic requirement
(grounded in the AECA and the 1952 Agreement) of "legitimate self defense,"
Israel is required to meet three additional criteria before resorting to using U.S.-
made CMs: (a) a war must be in progress; (b) the weapon is to be used against
"military, fortified targets"; 4 6 and (c) these targets are to be Arab armies. 47
Although President Ford promised Peres that he would advise the newly
elected President Carter to confirm the weapons supply to Israel, 48 two months
later, on February 17, 1977, Carter canceled his predecessor's decision and
declared that the CBU-72 bombs might even be withdrawn from U.S. arsenals.49
Israel's statement that "it had committed itself late last year not to employ the
bombs as anti-personnel weapons" did not dissuade Carter, whose position was
final.o
B. Israeli Use of CMs in the 1978 Litani Operation and the U.S. Response:
Clarifications
In March 1978, the first diplomatic crisis over the use of CMs materialized
MilitaryLaw/ pdf/RC-conf-experts-1976.pdf.
39. Binder, supra note 33.
40. Finney, supra note 32.
41. See Nissim Kiviti, U.S. Will Limit the Use of Shock Bombs, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Oct. 17,
1976, at 1, 8 (in Hebrew). It should be noted that Kiviti's sources are U.S. Congress members.
42. See Dan Margalit, Rumsfeld to Peres: The Pentagon Has Ended its Examination of the
Weapons Deal, HAARETZ, Dec. 16, 1976, at 1 for Israeli press reports on the visit.
43. See ESPINOSA & JANKA, supra note 12, for the date of signing.
44. RicHARD MoYEs & THOMAS NASH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 7 (Simon Conway
ed., Landmine Action 2005) (quoting a letter sent by Ezer Weizman, Israel's Minister of Defense, to
congressional leaders in May 1978); David Wood, Israel Said to Violate Rules on Bombs' Use, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 1982, at Al.
45. See McCormack, supra note 13.
46. See Oberdorfer, supra note 30.
47. Bernard Gwertzman, Israelis Renew Pledge to Curb Cluster Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1978, at 1. See Cloud, supra note 9, at Al, for the stipulations; MOYES & NASH supra note 44, at 9.
48. See Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, Minister of Defense Upon His Return from Washington: The
Motion in the Pentagon: Favorable to Israel, YEDIOT AHARONOT, FRIDAY MAGAZINE, Dec. 17, 1976,
at 1. It should be noted that Ford's decision was perceived as politically motivated. See, e.g., Binder,
supra note 33; Gwertzman, supra note 35.
49. Binder, supra note 33.
50. See id., for Israel's Embassy Spokesman response.
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within less than 15 months of the signing of the agreement when Israel invaded
South Lebanon (the Litani Operation) following a deadly terrorist attack.5 1 A
March 20, 1976 media report about Israel's aerial attack using CMs lead
Congressman Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-CA) to call President Carter inquiring if
the 1952 Agreement had been violated.52
Faced with the press reports and CIA confirmation of Israel's CM use, which
was delivered to the members of Congress on April 5, the Carter Administration
had no choice but to report that Israeli violations of the 1952 Agreement "may
have occurred."53 A U.S. State Department spokesperson later explained that
discussions were being held with Israel "to assur[e] that those restrictions . . . be
observed in the future."54 According to Israeli press reports, the then-U.S.
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, sent a clear message to Moshe Dayan, Israel's
Minister of Foreign Affairs, demanding "a renewed and clear commitment not to
use cluster bombs save in a war in which Israel was attacked."5 5 A week later,
Israel was forced to consent to "'new and tighter restrictions" through an exchange
of notes dated April 10 and 11, 1978 (hereinafter the 1978 Notes).56
Nevertheless, the 1978 terms were, in essence, similar to the 1976 Agreement:
Israel was permitted to employ the weapon against "regular forces of a sovereign
nation" and in "special wartime conditions."57 Yet, in a clear response to that
current crisis, the 1978 Notes defined the terms of use. "Special wartime
conditions" were defined "as equal to or exceeding the level of conflict during the
1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars, when Israel was fighting two or more nations."
Furthermore and most importantly given the 2006 entanglement, the 1978 Notes
stipulated that "cluster bombs cannot be used in or adjacent to areas of civilian
populations." 5 9 Finally, Israel provided assurance "that Israel[i] field commanders
will not employ these weapons without a decision by politically responsible
51. Background Note: Lebanon, Jan. 2009, Dep't St. Publ'n, available at http://www.state.gove/r
/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (last visited October 11, 2009).
52. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Says Israelis in Lebanon Used Cluster Bombs, Breaking Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1978, at 1, 4. The Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
Douglas J. Bennet, was forced to admit that it was "... a use contrary to previous assurances given to
us." See Gwertzman, supra note 47, at 4.
53. MICHAEL F. BROWN, ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT: ISRAELI BREACHES & U.S. INDULGENCE
RESULT IN PALESTINIAN & LEBANESE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 6 (The Palestine Center 2008), available
at http://thejerusalemfund.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/3061; Grimmett, supra note 11, at 6;
ESPINOSA & JANKA, supra note 12, at 16.
54. Oberdorfer, supra note 30, at A17.
55. U.S. Demands Israel Provide Assurances to Restrict Dropping Cluster Bombs, DAVAR, Apr.
14, 1978, at Al.
56. MOYES & NASH, supra note 44; Oberdorfer, supra note 30.
57. MoYEs & NASH, supra note 44, at 9 (quoting George Skelton, Cluster Bombs for Israel Held
Back, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 20, 1982, at 1).
58. Id.
59. See Wood, supra note 44, at 10; Charles Mohr, '78 Pact Said to Limit Israeli Use of Cluster
Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1982, at A12.
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superiors [Israel's Minister of Defense]."60 With such clarifications and specific
stipulations the 1978 Notes were far from a mere Israeli reaffirmation of its 1976
commitment.
With that said, the strain in the bilateral relations dissipated within weeks and,
in fact, in his report to Congress, Vance stated that "no action was contemplated to
deprive Israel of further military equipment."61 The reasons for this Israeli
diplomatic success would become relevant to the 2006 crisis.
Israel, in addition to admitting to a breach of the 1976 Agreement, issued a
62formal apology and promised no further violations would occur. It was later
revealed that Ezer Weizman, Israel's then-Minister of Defense, pleaded ignorance
of the use of CM weapons as well as the existence of the 1976 Agreement; he
blamed the entire incident on the failure of the IDF Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur
to update him appropriately.63 To the Israeli press, Weizman claimed: "They have
a case and I told them so. Had I known about the existence of the letter of
commitment, I would have considered the matter differently .... In such a case,
truth is the best thing."64 Consequently, as the Administration informed Paul N.
McCloskey, Jr. regarding its request for renewed Israeli assurances, the State
Department had expressed "strong concern . . . that effective procedures be
instituted to ensure that the assurances given . . . are known and effective in the
context of Israeli decision-making." 65 Nonetheless, realpolitik played an important
role in the U.S. consent, as Vance clearly stated in his report: Israel's promise to
withdraw from Lebanon (in compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution
425)66 and its efforts "to restore movement in the peace negotiation" were behind
the decision not "to deprive Israel of further military equipment." 67
Within a year, on August 7, 1979, the Carter Administration again reported to
Congress that Israel may have violated U.S. law by using U.S.-supplied arms
during its raids into Lebanon.68 This time, the weapons in question were U.S.-
made aircraft and artillery, which were deployed inside South Lebanon.69 Israel
60. Oberdorfer, supra note 30. The source of this sensitive information - leaked as background of
the 1982 crisis over the same issue - seems to have been Paul N. McCloskey, a frequent critic of Israel.
Nevertheless, the Israeli press reported that the U.S had requested that "Israel undertake to avoid using
cluster bombs in a non real war cases." Avner Tavori, Israel to Promise the U.S. to Limit the Use of
Cluster Bombs to A Real War, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Apr. 17, 1978, at 2.
61. Gwertzman, supra note 52, at 4.
62. Id. at 1; Danaher, supra note 26, at 52.
63. Weizman's explanation was made known from a letter which had been sent approximately one
month following the U.S. letter, i.e., mid May. MOYES & NASH, supra note 44, at 8; Danaher, supra
note 26, at 52.
64. Eitan Haber, Weisman: Hoping to Return to Cairo in the Next Days [interview], YEDIOT
AHARONOT, Apr. 21, 1978, at 1, 4.
65. The Letter was sent by Bennett to McCloskey, who made it available to the N.Y. Times. See
Gwertzman, supra note 47, at 4.
66. S.C. Res. 425, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978).
67. Gwertzman, supra note 52, at 4.
68. Bernard Gwertzman, Vance Asserts Israel May Violate Pact by Using U.S. Jets in Air Raids,
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 8, 1979, at Al.
6 9. Id.
10 VOL. 38:1
DOOMED TO BE VIOLATED?
announced that its use was in self-defense; future use and use of American
weapons would be more carefully supervised.70 Although CMs were not involved
on this occasion, it was clear that this incident, coupled with the April 1978
reassurances, meant that should the CM issue arise once more, mediating the likely
ensuing strain in relations would be much harder.
C. Israel's Use of CMs in the 1982 Lebanon War and the U.S. Response:
Suspension
The 1982 crisis over the use of U.S.-made Cluster bombs seemed almost
inevitable given the scope and intensity of fighting that broke out between Israel
and the Palestinian militias and between the IDF and the Syrian army during the
1982 First Lebanon War. Subsequent to a July 2 news report from Beirut on
Israeli use of U.S.-made CMs (confirmed by the technical data and serial numbers
on the duds found),72 it was almost impossible for the U.S. Administration to
restrain from applying sanctions to Israel.73
On July 15, as a CIA report on Israeli CM was being circulated in Congress,
the Reagan Administration delivered a confidential letter to Congressional leaders
reporting that a "'substantial violation"' by Israel of the AECA "'may have
occurred." 74 The letter, while mentioning specific U.S. weapons, did not explicitly
note the CMs because no Israeli clarifications had been received despite repeated
State Department "requests."7 5 Israel's response, delivered later that day,
acknowledged CM use but stated that its use was "within the conditions laid down
70. See, e.g., id; Oberdorfer, supra note 30; Ron Ben-Yeshi, Vance, We May Take Measures If
Israel Keeps Operating Weapons from U.S. in Lebanon, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Aug. 8, 1979, at 3, for
more on this incident.
71. Indeed, Israeli CMs mainly targeted Syrian infantry and armored forces in the area of the
Beirut-Damascus highway and Palestinian camps in the southern outskirts of Beirut. See David B.
Ottaway, Israel Said to Deny Misuse ofBombs, WASH. POST, July 19, 1982, at Al, Al9.
72. The reporter was the famous London Times Middle East correspondent, Robert Fisk. For
Fisk's reflections on his intensive efforts to collect as much evidence as possible on Israel's use of U.S.-
made CMs, see ROBERT FISK, PITY THE NATION 277-78 (Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books 2002)
(1990). Already in June 30, 1982, however, President Reagan voiced concern over reports on Israeli use
of CMs, saying that the U.S. "is reviewing the question" whether its law were violated. See Jack
Nelson, Reagan Denies Giving Israelis a 'Green Light, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1982, at Bl.
73. During a Congressional hearing on June 21, 1982, Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) warned
Israel of a harsh response. See Bernard Weinraub, Senate Panel Increases Lebanese Aid Proposal, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1982, at A8. The then Israeli P.M. Menachem Begin received a testy lecture by the
Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Clement Zablocki, on this subject. William
Chapman, Zablocki Says Arms Pledge Broken in Israeli Attack, WASH. POST, June 22, 1982, at A14.
For news reports affecting congressmen at that time, see William Branigin, 'Dirty War' in Lebanon Is
Causing a Backlash Against U.S, WASH. POST, June 21, 1982, at Al9.
74. Ottaway, supra note 71, at Al; Hedrick Smith, U.S. is Holding up Shipment ofArms Ordered
by Israel, N Y. TIMES, July 17, 1982, at A4. It is important to note that besides CMs, the entire question
of U.S.-supplied arms used by Israel was raised due to the 1952 Agreement and the AEAC's conditions.
Id. at 4. As Zablocki was quoted in Smith, Id: "I can't by any stretch of the imagination see how using
planes, tanks and artillery deep in the territory of another country is defensive."
75. Eleanor Randolph, Israel Answers U.S. on Use of Cluster Bombs, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1982,
at Al, A7.
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in the sale of U.S. arms": i.e., only for defensive purposes and against military
targets solely. 76 Moreover, Syria's intervention had turned the confrontation into a
"full-scale war."77
Nevertheless, on July 19, after succumbing to pressure from Congress and the
Pentagon at a time when Senator Charles H. Percy, then Chair of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, described bilateral relations as "at an all-time
low,"7 ' Reagan suspended the shipment of artillery-delivered CMs to Israel,
scheduled for that same day. 79 The suspension-for which Israel blamed U.S.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger-troubled Israel, which publicly
announced its concern over ". . . this trend of punishing Israel whenever
disagreements between the two states arise."o
On July 28, Reagan extended this suspension "indefinitely";8 1 the move was
criticized by some congressmen as a "minimal" or "inadequate" response to the
violation.8 2  Israel found some comfort in the fact that Reagan's decision was
political rather than legal,83 but given the importance it ascribed to securing a
continuous supply of CMs, high priority was given to indigenous production of
artillery-delivered CMs: firing tests were conducted already in 1982 and by 1984 a
sufficient arsenal had been built.84
Yet, in the summer of 1986, eight senior Israeli officials were subpoenaed by
a Federal Grand Jury investigating an illegal attempt to export American
technology for manufacturing artillery-delivered CM.85 After the affair subsided,
76. Ottaway, supra note 71, at Al.
77. Report of Israel's government-run radio, as cited in id. See also Bernard Gwertzman, Israelis
Concede and Defend Use of Cluster Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1982, at Al, A7. For the text of this
governmental announcement, delivered on July 18, 1982, in the Israeli press, see Arie Zimoki & Joshua
Halmis, Jerusalem is Waiting for Reagan's Moves, YEDIOT AHARONOT, July 18, 1982, at 1, 7.
78. Gwertzman, supra note 77, at A7.
79. See Michael Getler, President Halts Shipment Of 'Cluster' Shells to Israel, WASH. POST, July
20, 1982, at Al; George Skelton, Cluster Bombs for Israel Held Back, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1982, at Bi.
80. Zeev Barak, Jerusalem: Suspension of Cluster Bombs-The Victory of Weinberger's
Approach, YEDIOT AHARONOT, July 20, 1982, at 1, 6.
81. Formally, the July 28th State Department statement mentioned only artillery-delivered CMs
and indeed the shipment contained 4,000, 155mm CM shells for Israel's 155mm howitzers. However, as
Israel by that time had manufactured its own air-delivered CM, it was tantamount to a total ban on CMs
supplied to Israel. See Judith Miller, U.S. Bars Cluster Shells for Israel Indefinitely, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1982, at A16; GRIMMETT, supra note 11, at 5.
82. See Eleanor Randolph, U.S. Halts All Cluster Bomb Aid to Israelis, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1982,
at Bl.
83. As Israel stressed, this implied that "Reagan is refraining from blaming Israel in breaching its
commitment - which would have required a total suspension of weapons shipment." See Zeev Barak,
"Until Further Notice ", Reagan Suspends Supply of Cluster Bombs to Israel, YEDIOT AHARONOT, July
28, 1982, at 3.
84. Dan Fisher, Israel Denies Smuggling Cluster Bomb Technology From US, L.A. TIMES, July
10, 1986, at 9. Fisher relied on the statement made at the time to Israeli television by Yitzhak Rabin, the
Minister of Defense.
85. The eight officials were part of Israel's military procurement office stationed in New York.
Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Investigates Possible Plot to Send Bomb Technology to Israel, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 1986, at A14. Senior Israeli officials denied the suspicions, arguing that Israel was producing
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Israel bought the needed equipment in Europe. Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's then-
Minister of Defense, clarified in an interview that "[y]ou can buy . . . (such
technologies) freely, without any government complications."86 Only in December
1988, following a prolonged Israeli campaign, was an understanding reached and
the ban revoked.
III. THE 2006 LEBANON WAR AND THE USE OF U.S.-MADE CLUSTER BOMBS
A. Israel's Unprecedented Response to Criticism over Its Extensive Use of CMs
Considering the 2006 Second Lebanon War's limited geographic boundaries
and short duration (34 days), an unprecedented quantity of CMs were fired by
Israel.88  In addition to the small-scale use of indigenous M85 bomblets, 89 there
was extensive use of U.S.-made CMs delivered by U.S.-made 155mm artillery
shells, Multiple Launch Rocket System's (MLRS) M26 rockets, and-albeit on a
limited scale-Vietnam-era aerially delivered bombs (CBU-58B). 90 As more than
1,800 rockets were fired at Lebanon-each rocket containing 644 bomblets-more
the weapon in its own facilities and according to its own designs. As Rabin clarified: "Whoever looks at
the Israeli bomblet next to the American bomblet will immediately see that there is no similarity" See
Dan Fisher, supra note 84. For the affair, see also Phil Shenon, Israelis Contest U.S. Subpoenas in
Inquiry on Bomb Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1986, at Al.
86. See Dan Fisher, Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews Its Arms Industry, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1986, at Al7.
87. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, US Lifts Ban on Cluster Bombs for Israel, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 8,
1988, at 4; Yoav Kami, The U.S. Lifts the 1982 Embargo on Selling Israel Cluster Bombs, HAARETZ,
Dec. 6, 1988, at 1. It should be noted that in the domestic arena, Israeli officials attempted to underrate
this by pointing to Israel's own CM production. See Aral Ginai, U.S. Removes Cluster Bombs Supply
Ban to Israel, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Dec. 7, 1988, at 5.
88. Kalb & Saivetz, supra note 4, at 43; Meron Rapoport, When Rockets and Phosphorous
Cluster, HAARETZ, Sept. 13, 2006, at 3 (an interview with MLRS's battalion commander). For a brief
overview of the complex historical predicates to the 2006 War (Operation Change Direction) from 1978
onwards, see Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the
International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 130-34 (2008), available at
http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v29n2-schmitt.pdf.
89. Each M395 and M396 155mm artillery shells contain 63 bomblets each. Some 130 Israeli-
made Trajectory Correction System (TCS) rockets, first operational in this war (see Press Release,
Ramat Hasharon, Israel Military Industries, IMI's Trajectory Corrected Rocket Operated and Combat
Proven in the 2nd Lebanon War (May 15, 2007), available at http://www.imi-israel.com/news.aspx?
FolderlD=13&doclD=662) have nothing to do with the rocket's content (644 M77 bomblets). Data
presented to the author at the IMI exhibit marking Israel's 60th anniversary, Rishon LeZion, 16-23
Sept. 2008; see also Amnon Barzilai, A Precise Rocket for 40 kIn for IDF Use, HAARETZ, Aug. 17,
2004, at 6.
90. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON: ISRAEL'S USE OF CLUSTER
MUNITIONS IN LEBANON IN JULY AND AUGUST 2006 32 (Human Rights Watch 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/02/16/flooding-south-lebanon?print. No exact data are available
for the number of air-dropped CMs (CBU-58B with 650 bomblets each) used, but as of mid-January
2008, 28,136 duds BLU-63 bomblets from the 2006 War were found; these constitute 20% of the total
number of duds destroyed by the deminers. It was argued that CBU-71 cluster bombs were used as well,
but so far no related duds (BLU-68/B bomblets) have been found. See WILLIAM M. ARKIN, DIviNING
VICTORY: AIRPOWER IN THE 2006 ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH WAR 64 (Air University Press 2007).
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than 1.1 million cluster bombs were dispersed from this weapon system alone.91
Nevertheless, while even amidst intense fighting, few accusations in the
international media claimed Israel's use of CMs illegal.92 The world outcry against
Israel was raised only in the war's aftermath. 93 Even then-U.N. Secretary General
(UNSG) Kofi Annan condemned Israel, 94 while Annan's aide, the Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General Jan
Egeland, focused his criticism on the "shocking and completely immoral" fact that
"90 percent of the cluster-bomb strikes occurred in the last 72 hours of the conflict,
when everybody knew there would be an end to hostilities." 95
The international outcry against Israel's extensive use of CMs during the War
was quickly reflected in Israel's open media but with surprisingly intense
aftershocks. "The cluster bomb," argued the influential Israeli newspaper Haaretz,
"is not a banned weapon, but it is described as an 'indiscriminate' weapon, which
should not be used against targets in civilian areas because, [among other things],
it continues to kill once the war is over."9 6 Haaretz went on to publish numerous
articles on this issue; all were harshly critical of the weapon's use.97 On September
4, 2006, a legal response was initiated by The Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI) which appealed to Israel's Attorney General Meni Mazuz to commence
the investigation into circumstances behind the decision to use CMs.98 A similar
appeal was made that same month to Israel's Inquiry Commission into the Second
Lebanon War (Winograd Commission), which has since reviewed Israel's use of
CMs and its legality.99
91. See Rapoport, supra note 88. See also Amir Rapaport, FRIENDLY FIRE 344 (2007).
92. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 3.
93. See Kalb & Saivetz, supra note 4, at 46-47.
94. Yoav Stem & News Agency (AP), Annan Condemns IDF Use of Cluster Bombs, HAARETZ,
Sept. 1, 2006, at 3.
95. This information was provided by UNIFIL observers. See Emergency Relief Coordinator, Press
Conference (Aug. 30, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060830
Egeland.doc.htm. It led many Lebanese to believe that Israel's intention was " . . . to litter the south with
unexploded cluster bombs as a strategy to keep people from returning right away." See Michael
Slackman, Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A10. For a criticism of IDF
policy, see, e.g., Yoav Stem & News Agency (AP), supra note 94; Todd Pitman, Unexploded Israeli
Bombs Menace Lebanese, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Aug. 31, 2006.
96. Editorial, Shooting Without a Target, HAARETZ, Sept. 14, 2006, at 5.
97. See, e.g., Rapoport, supra note 88; Meron Rapoport, Lebanese Child is Killed by an Israeli
Cluster Bomb, HAARETZ, Sept. 28, 2006, at A2; Rapoport, supra note 8.
98. Mazuz was also requested to "examine the level of personal responsibility for all those
involved in the firing of these weapons, including the political echelons, in the event that they
authorized their use." Letter from Sonia Boulos, Adv., ACRI to Meni Mazuz, AG, Ministry of Justice,
10(a) (Sept. 4, 2006), available at http://www.acri.org.il/eng/story.aspx?id=327.
99. The report- released in Jan. 2008- is known as the Winograd Commission after its chair,
Justice (Ret.) Dr. Eliyahu Winograd. Other members include Law Professor Ruth Gavison, Political
Science Professor Yehezkel Dror, and IDF Reserve Generals Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel. See
The Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006, The Second Lebanon War, Final Rep.
[unclassified version], [hereinafter, Winograd Final Rep.]; see also ACRI's appeal to the Winograd
Commission Letter from Sonia Boulos, Adv., ACRI to Dr. Eliyahu, Judge (Ret.), Winograd, (Sept. 26,
2006), available at http://www.acri.org.il/eng/story.aspx?id=340.
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Israel was no doubt surprised by the barrage. These attacks were, however, of
little comparison to past incidents in which Israel was criticized for using "dubious
weapons" such as flechette armor rounds in the Gaza Strip since 2001.100
Moreover, the traditional IDF response to the NGO's complaints, "[w]e use all
munitions within the confines of international humanitarian law . . ."1o1 was no
longer accepted by the international community.
However, while the government's initial formal response stressed that
"strenuous efforts were made to ensure that these [IDF operations] were carried out
in complete accordance with international law, both with regard to method and
weaponry,"1 02 on November 19, 2006, Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz, took a surprisingly
different line of defense stating that the use of CMs often constituted a clear
violation of his explicit order not to fire into populated zones. 103
Halutz's response was apparently due to a preliminary IDF "operational
inquiry into the use of cluster munitions throughout the Israeli-Lebanese conflict,"
conducted by Brig. Gen. Michel Ben-Baruch, of the IDF's Ground Forces
Command, at Halutz's request. 104 Ben-Baruch's probe-which, unlike previous
IDF internal inquiries, was classified prior to the moment Halutz issued his
statement-found that while the IDF had complied with Halutz's order, the same
order was ignored by the Artillery Corps, which fired thousands of cluster bombs
"mainly in the War's last days."105 More importantly, as part of his statement,
Halutz assigned the Commander of the IDF Military College, Maj. Gen. Gershon
HaCohen, "to look into the implementation of all orders and instructions regarding
the use of cluster type munitions, in the course of the conflict."1 06 The statement's
text, however, raised doubts whether a further inquiry was needed. 0 7
As expected, Halutz's announcement astonished the Israeli public and caused
resentment among Israeli war veterans who felt that they had followed IDF orders
when firing. This bitterness became open on the following day, in press reports
100. See SIPRI, THE LAW OF WAR AND DuBious WEAPONS 70-72 (1976) (discussing the dubious
nature of the flechette weapon). For an overview into Israel's use of flechette weapons as well as a
history of the weapon, see EITAN BARAK, DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGALITY OF FLECHETTE
WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A Reappraisal Following Israel's Use Of Flechette Rounds In The
Gaza Strip (2001-Present), (forthcoming 2009), (on file with the author).
101. For such a response see, e.g., News Release, Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Israeli Cluster
Munitions Threaten Civilians (Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/08/17/
lebanon-israeli-cluster-munitions-threaten-civilians.
102. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 5.
103. See Hason & Rapoport, supra note 6; Joshua, supra note 6.
104. IDF Spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Ha'cohen Appointed to Inquire the Circumstances of the Use of
Cluster Munitions During the Israeli-Lebanese Conflict (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://thehague
.mfa.gov.iI/mfm/Data/104928.pdf.
105. Hason & Rapoport, supra note 6.
106. See IDF Spokesperson, supra note 104; Greg Myre, Israel Orders Investigation of Bomb Use
in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A8 (discussing international repercussions).
107. After emphasizing the weapon's legality per se, it stated "safety warnings were given by the
IDF to the civilian population, ... the firing of cluster munitions was directed only at legitimate military
targets... " (emphasis added). Id.
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effectively contradicting Halutz's claim. 108
Queries over Halutz's statement in light of its meaning-i.e., the ground
forces were disobedient and did not follow orders-were reflected daily in the
Israeli press for two full weeks and has only gained in strength. Surprisingly, while
news reports were citing war veterans' testimonies that the CMs' deployment
throughout the war was maximally regulated, the IDF preferred being presented as
an unruly army. Instead of supporting these frontline testimonies, military sources
were cited as saying that "this story only demonstrates the scope of the army's
mess,"' apparently to expose Halutz's lack of control over the army.109 Given the
fact that the IDF is highly sensitive to allegations of internal disorder, especially
due to the repeated NGO allegations about unlawful actions of soldiers and officers
in the Occupied Territories,110 this is quite surprising. Furthermore, a week
following Halutz's November 19t announcement, reporters had already been
informed of the identity of the army officer suspected of using CMs in populated
areas during the war's last days "[i]n direct opposition to an order": Officer
Commanding (O.C.) Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam. 1 This easily
available scapegoat had resigned his post two months earlier: September 13,
2006.112 The unexpected refusal of "[h]igh-ranking sources" in the Northern
Command to deny this charge only intensified the public's image of an army out of
control. 113
However, although given the secrecy over the 1976 Agreement no official
documentation will be available for some time, the key to understanding the IDF's
seemingly counterproductive admission-severe internal disorder-is found in
Israel's relationship with the U.S at the time.
B. Israel's 2006 CM Use and the Bush Administration
In late August 2006, the U.S. State Department Office of Defense Trade
Controls Compliance (DTCC) launched an inquiry into Israel's use of U.S.-made
CMs114 and-to the satisfaction of numerous NGOs"-a shipment of additional
108. See, e.g., Rapoport, supra note 7, at 2. One MLRS battery commander even testified that all
targets north of the Litani River-those targets massively bombarded in the last 72 hours - were
described at the time as "General Staff targets." See Meron Rapoport, A Testimony: The General Staff
Had Authorized All Cluster Bomb Firings North of the Litani, HAARETZ, Nov. 21, 2006, at A4; Yossi
Joshua, All Knew That We are Firing Cluster Bombs, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Nov. 21, 2006, at 2.
109. See Joshua, supra note 6.
110. See, e.g., Yael Stein, B'tselem, Case Study No. 17, Soldiers' Abuse Of Palestinians In Hebron
3 (2002).
111. See Yaakov Katz, N. Command Ordered Cluster Bombing, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 28, 2006,
available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1162378506069&pagename=JPost%2FJP
Article%2FShowFul.
112. Jonathan Lis, MK Ayalon Calls on Peretz to Resign as Defense Minister, HAARETZ, Sept. 13,
2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/762240.html.
113. As Haaretz journalist and columnist Uzi Benziman wrote the following day: "In the General
Staff, the core of security policy, failures have been exposed that appear to be a symptom of the
defective work of a culture of fudging. The Chief of Staff [sic] reveals that his explicit orders to avoid
firing cluster bombs were not followed." Uzi Benziman, It's All Shoddy, HAARETZ, Nov. 29, 2006, at 5.
114. See Cloud, supra note 9 (erroneously, Cloud refers to DTCC by its previous name); Pitman,
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CMs (M-26 rockets for the MLRS), which Israel had asked the U.S. to send during
the war to offset the depletion of its own stocks, was immediately held up. 116 More
importantly, as part of its inquiry the U.S. demanded clarifications from Israel,
which created a weighty predicament for Israel. 117
Apparently, as U.S. officials interpreted the events, "in view of [former]
President Bush's publicly announced support for Israel's action,"18 Israeli
clarifications regarding its campaign against Hezbollah as legitimate self-defense
(i.e., the CM's use complied with both the AECA and the 1952 Agreement) should
not encounter many obstacles in terms of the Administration.1 19 However, not only
were none of these legal instruments the DTCC's focus (rather, the 1976 End-Use
Agreement, as discussed in this Article, was the focus), it was the third time that
CM use in Lebanon was responsible for straining Israeli-U.S. relations within the
last three decades.
Therefore, given the 1978 and 1982 crises and the possible U.S. sanctions
(ranging from a repeat of the 1982 CM supply moratorium to a total U.S. arms
sales ban, as suggested in April 1978 by Rep. McCloskey), 120 Halutz's
unprecedented admission seems more than plausible. In fact, in light of the April
1978 crisis and the subsequent Israeli pledge to assimilate the restrictions placed
on CMs by Israel's senior military and government officials, low-ranking non-
obedience was one of the few explanations at Israel's disposal. Indeed, this account
caused Israel great discomfort, as noted previously, but it did provide Israel with a
valuable asset once the U.S. inquiry began: time.
Halutz's announcement of HaCohen's appointment provided an additional
supra note 95. For an excellent, albeit highly one-sided, overview of various cases in which such an
inquiry was initiated in regard to Israel, see BROWN, supra note 53.
115. See Open Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Stephen J.
Hadley, U S. National Security Advisor (Aug. 11, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
news/2006/08/1 1/letter-national-security-advisor-hadley-requested-us-cluster-munition-transfer-israe.
116. See Cloud, supra note 9. For Israel's request in early August, see David S. Cloud, Weapons:
Israel Asks U.S. to Ship Rockets with Wide Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at Al. A license for the
sale of 1,300 M26 was approved in Fiscal Year 2005. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.:
Deny Israeli Request for Cluster Munitions, (Aug. 11, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/
en/news/2006/08/1 1/us-deny-israeli-request-cluster-munitions.
117. Journalists were informed that the State Department was "seeking more information on Israel's
alleged improper use" which it takes "very seriously." E-mail from Patricia Peterson, Department of
State spokesperson, to Arms Control Today (Sept. 14, 2006), cited in Wade Boese, Cluster
Munitions Under New Scrutiny, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2006, at 38; see also Cloud, supra note 9.
118. Cloud, supra note 9.
119. See, e.g., JEREMY M. SHARP ET AL., U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33566, LEBANON: THE
ISRAEL-HAMAS-HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT (Aug. 14, 2006) (discussing For Bush Administration's
repeatedly "unequivocal support for Israel" during the 2006 War). Nonetheless, explaining the massive
use of the CM in the last 72 hours of the war could have been more problematic.
120. McCloskey had sent a letter to all House members as well as to President Carter and Israeli
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, proposing an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Bill calling for
termination of all arms deliveries to Israel in the event of any future CM use against civilian targets. See
Oberdorfer, supra note 30, at A17.
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pause, necessary for the entire process to come to an end: the IDF's Military
Advocate General (MAG) Brig. Gen. Avihai Mendelblit, who Halutz had assigned
to review the HaCohen inquiry's findings, now had time to decide further
actions. 121 Hence, when the DDTC inquiry was completed on January 29, 2007
and a classified preliminary report122 concluding that first, U.S.-made CMs were
"'misused in civilian areas"' and second, Israel had breached a clandestine bilateral
"Use Agreement," was forwarded to Congress, the IDF spokesman was able to
"decline comment until after that [the internal inquiry] was complete[d]." 23
Concurrently NGO attempts to take advantage of this report and prevent more
U.S.-made CM weapons from reaching Israel only reinforced the view that Israel's
time-gaining maneuver had proven itself.124
Shortly before the DTCC submitted its preliminary findings to Congress,
Israel submitted a short 12-page report to the State Department.125 In an
accompanying note, a senior U.S official commended its authors for their "great
cooperation" in the investigation. 126 While acknowledging the firing of "thousands
of American cluster munitions,"1 27 Israel denied violating the 1976 Agreement and
stressed its leafleting warning practices prior to employing CMs in populated areas
and the fact that "many of the villages were deserted because civilians had fled the
fighting."1 28 As a U.S. official stated, "From their perspective, use of the munitions
was clearly done within the agreements." 129 The atmosphere was such that Israel
felt it had almost settled the issue with the Bush Administration-undoubtedly one
of the friendlier administrations from Israel's perspective,130 and the January 17,
2007 resignation of wartime Chief of Staff Halutz only contributed to this
rapprochement as U.S. officials joined their Israeli counterparts in an effort to
mitigate the entanglement. 131 Israel's CM use, stressed the U.S. Embassy
121. See IDF Spokesperson, supra note 104.
122. The AECA requires Congressional notification of even preliminary findings regarding
possible violations. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c)(2) (1976).
123. News Agencies, U.S.: Israel May Have Breached Cluster Bomb Agreement During War,
HAARETZ, Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/819096.html; see Andrew
Buncombe, U.S. Attacks Israel's Cluster Bomb Use, THE INDEPENDENT (London) Jan. 29, 2007, at 28;
David S. Cloud & Greg Myre, Israel May Have Violated Arms Pact, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2007, at Al.
124. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, United States: Cut off Cluster Munition Sales
to Israel (Jan. 29, 2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/29/usintl5212.htm. For an explanation of
the aftershocks caused see News Release, supra note 101.
125. Cloud & Myre, supra note 123.




129. Id. See also, Yitzhak Benhorin, Report: Bush may Fault Israel on Cluster Bomb Claim,
YNETNEWS, Jan. 28, 2007, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3357638,00.html.
130. As Brown had complained about U.S. non-action regarding "misuse of American weaponry":
"President Bush failed to express impatience and dissatisfaction with Israeli military action at the height
of the summer carnage in Lebanon and in fact was a cheerleader for the Israeli action-as was almost
the entire U.S. Congress." BROWN, supra note 53, at 7.7.
131. AP, Israeli Army Chief ofStaffResigns Over Lebanon Failures, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan.
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spokesman in Tel Aviv, "isn't going to undermine our ironclad commitment to
Israel's security or hamper our excellent bilateral cooperation in many areas." 32
"A chiding from Washington, but nothing more," was the outcome predicted by
the late Zeev Schiff, one of Israel's leading military analysts. 133
Only in September 2007 was Israel's ongoing investigation officially
concluded by the MAG; 134 although the Winograd Commission's Final Report
suggests that already on January 17, 2007-when HaCohen testified before the
Winograd Commission-he could already provide conclusive findings. 135 By that
time, however, the necessity of this puzzling investigation was understood as well
as its usefulness to the U.S. State Department in repelling questions over its own
inquiry. 136
Furthermore, the completion of Mendelblit's review in September 2007 was
kept a secret until December 24, when the threat of sanctions was completely
dispelled. On that day, the IDF spokesman issued a statement, intentionally
targeted for worldwide publication, that the MAG had "recently concluded his
evaluation." 3 7 The statement stressed the MAG's declaration that the IDF's use of
CMs accorded with IHL; that "the IDF had complied with the Chief of Staff's
17, 2007, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israeli-army-chief-of-
staff-resigns-over-lebanon-failures-432475.html.
132. Stewart Tuttle, U.S. Embassy spokesman. Israeli security officials anonymously stated "that
they didn't expect sanctions." See Amy Teibel (AP), U.S. Faults Israeli Use of Cluster Bombs But
Report Unlikely to Harm Relations, Americans Say, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 31, 2007,
available at http://www.seattlepi.com/national/301777_israel3 1.html.
133. Amy Teibel (AP), US-Israeli Relations Unlikely to be Hurt by Israeli Cluster Bomb Use,
Analysts Say, Jan. 30, 2007 (no longer available, on file with author). On February 1, 2007, in another
unprecedented move, Israel's deputy prime minister at the time, Shimon Peres, told an Al Jazeera
reporter referring to the use of CMs: "To be short and clear, we committed a mistake, regrettably." He
made sure to add, however, that it was done "apparently ... without the knowledge even of the Chief-
of-Staff." See Peres: Cluster Bombs A Mistake, ALJAZEERA, Feb. 1, 2007, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/01/2008525 12206640997.html.
134. See MAG, Brig. Gen. Avihai Mendelblit Main Points of MAG's Legal Opinion for Inquiring
Officer Over the Circumstance of Employing Cluster Munitions during the Second Lebanon War, June
18, 2008 (in Hebrew), cited in Eitan Barak, Association for Israel Studies Annual Conference, Israel in
2009: Center and Periphery, June 1-3, 2009, None to be Trusted: Israel's Use of Cluster Munitions in
the Second Lebanon War and the Case for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, available at
http://www.aisisraelstudies.org/Conferences/2009_Sapir/2009Papers/Barak2009.pdf.
135. See Winograd Final Rep., supra note 99. It is still unknown as to when these findings were
submitted to the MAG.
136. See, e.g., Sean McCormack, Assistant Sec'y of State for Pub. Affairs, U.S. State Dep't., State
Department Regular News Briefing (Feb. 23, 2007). In response to a question, Sean McCormack said
"[w]e are still gathering some information from the Israeli side. They still have an investigation that is
ongoing." Id. Indeed, in September 2007, the Israeli press reported a request by a State Department
senior official, during a visit to Israel, for data on CM used in the 2006 War. See Barak Ravid, The US
to Israel: Stop Flights in Lebanon, HAARETZ, Sept. 20, 2007, at A4.
137. The secrecy over the date of the MAG's review reached such a level that even the Winograd
Commission, which was about to conclude its final report, promptly requested a copy for review after
hearing the spokesman's statement. See Winograd Final Rep., supra note 99, at 496, 14.
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orders forbidding the firing of cluster munitions at built-up areas"; 138 and that
precautions had been taken in all cases excluding one in which CMs were indeed
"fired at residential areas/neighborhoods." 39
As expected, the statement attracted considerable attention as well as criticism
in Israel1 40 and abroad. 14 1 In Israel, however, it was welcomed by the IDF artillery
veterans who had fought in the 2006 War because it vindicated their claims that
they had strictly obeyed orders from day one and that they were neither
uncontrolled nor irresponsible. 142 The Bush Administration's spokesperson then
abruptly announced that the State Department's 2007 report "does not draw
conclusions on Israel's use of cluster munitions"1 43 while adding that the U.S.
government will "continue discussions" with Israel over "the findings of its
internal investigation." 144
In May 2008, it had become clear that the crisis was effectively and officially
over. During a briefing on the U.S. CM Policy, Stephen D. Mull, the U.S. Acting
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, was forced to address this
subject. After pointing out Israel's "strict internal review," Assistant Secretary
Mull stated that "very intensive" bilateral consultations were under way and
revealed that "[w]e just had a team in Israel."145  When asked about future CM
supplies to Israel, he first pointed to the new U.S. domestic legislation forbidding
the export of CMs having less than a 99% reliability rate.146 He also remarked that
given the unavailability of such U.S.-made CMs for export, "we are not providing
cluster munitions to foreign partners anymore." 47 Nevertheless, when asked about
138. IDF Spokesperson, Opinion of the Military Advocate General Regarding Use of Cluster
Munitions in Second Lebanon War (Dec. 24, 2007) (Eng. Version), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings.
139. The announcement also explained the need to use CMs and referred to cases where
"commanders deviated from orders." In the latter case, it was stated that given the circumstances and
the fact that even then, their use "was [still] in accordance with international law..." the MAG decided
not to take legal measures in response to the deviations. Id.
140. See, e.g., Amos Harel & Yuval Azoulay, IDF Won't Take Legal Action against Officers for
Firing Cluster Bombs in Lebanon, HAARETZ, Dec. 25, 2007, at 2; Yaakov Katz, Cluster Bomb Use Was
Legal in Lebanon IDF Judge Rules, Firing Them Was A Concrete Military Necessity, THE JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at 3; Meron Rapoport, The Post-War Bombings, HAARETZ, Jan. 1, 2008, at 5
(harshly criticizing IDF CM use against Lebanese civilian populations).
141. See, e.g., Josef Federman, Israeli Cluster Bombing Ruled within the Law: Military Ends Probe
of Strikes on Lebanon, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at Al 8; Isabel Kershner, Israel Won't Prosecute for
Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 25, 2007, at A4. For a harsh criticism, see, e.g.,
Editorial, Cluster Bombs: It's Still Not OK, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 26, 2007, at B6.
142. See Hanan Greenberg, Soldiers who Fired Cluster Bombs: We Knew We were Following the
Law, YNET, Dec. 25, 2007, available at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3486339,00.html.
143. Email from Department of State spokesperson, to Arms Control Today [ACT] (Jan. 4, 2008),
cited in Wade Boese, Israel Defends Past Cluster Arms Use, 38 ACT 14 (Jan.-Feb. 2008).
144. Id.
145. See Stephen D. Mull, Acting Asst. Sec'y for Political-Military Affairs Ambassador, On-the-
Record Briefing: On U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy (May 21, 2008), available at
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-%/o20english/2008/May/2008052216310leaifas0.8921015.html.
146. Id.; see Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 646 (b), 1844 Stat. (2008).
147. Mull, supra note 145.
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potential available U.S.-made CMs with negligible Hazardous Dud Rate (HDR),
he answered: "If there were a future request from Israel to purchase it . . . we'd
look at it at the time . . . We'd want to know-I know they're still looking at this
internally ... what restrictions that they would have in place on its use, what sort
of controls ... 148
Indeed, as of February 2009, no final determination has been made.
Irrespective of the new U.S. administration under President Obama, one may
assume that when it comes to the U.S.-Israel relationship, whether Israel's
extensive use of CMs in the 2006 Lebanon War violated U.S. legislation is a non-
issue. However, as we soon detail, in the wake of an absence of sanctions imposed
on Israel, its critics claimed that "the AECA application gap between the Reagan
and Bush II administrations suggests a United States increasingly prepared to look
the other way on Israeli human rights violations and the breaking of American
law" may occur too easily. 149
IV. DOOMED To BE VIOLATED? LESSONS FOR THE CCM
A. Legal Analysis: Israel and US. Legislation: Formal vs. Flexible Interpretation
In contrast to the above-mentioned claim by Israel's critics, looking closely at
the 2006 case, it seems that Israel breached neither the AECA nor the 1952
Agreement requiring that Israel use U.S.-made CMs only in the event of
"legitimate self defense." Furthermore, Israel's violations of the 1976 End-Use
Clandestine Agreement and the 1978 Notes-which rightly explains the focus of
the DTCC's inquiry-are not gross violations.
1. Legitimate self-defense?
According to Israel-as stated in identical letters sent to the UNSG and the
Security Council following the Hezbollah's deadly attacks on July 12, 2006-the
law of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides a legal basis for
Israel's military operation,150 and that in relaying these letters on the very day that
Israel's military operation began, Israel complied with the stipulation that a State
acting in self-defense immediately notify the Security Council.
Naturally, as the operation was perceived as "post-modem conflict involving
a 'state-like apparatus inside a State,"'"" the question of whether Israel's actions
complied with jus ad bellum has already attracted jurists' interests. 15 2 Therefore,
148. Id.
149. See BROWN, supra note 53, at 18.
150. As Israel notified, while exercising its right of self-defense "The State of Israel will take
appropriate actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to the shelling that
terrorizes our citizens." See U.N. GASC, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2006/515,A/60/937 (July 12, 2006)
[hereinafter July 12, 2006 Letters]. For an overview on Israel's detailed legal justification, see Schmitt,
supra note 88, at 136-41.
151. Jonathan Somer, Acts ofNon-State Armed Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict, 10
Asil Insight (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights060824.cfin.
152. See, e.g., id; Schmitt, supra note 88, at 163-64; Yael Ronen, Israel, Hizbollah, and the Second
Lebanon War, 9 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMAN. L. 362, 391-93 (2006).
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given the purpose of the Article, it is sufficient to point out that a recent in-depth
legal analysis, dedicated entirely to this question, concluded that "there is relative
agreement that Israel had the right to respond to the Hezbollah attacks pursuant to
the law of self-defense."153 Hence, we can focus on the U.S. perspective on this
issue by means of the AECA and 1952 Agreements.
As one may expect given the above-mentioned conclusion, a 2008
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report found that the Bush Administration
and the Congress "supported Israel's 2006 military campaigns against Hezbollah
and Hamas as acts of self-defense."1 54 On July 18, 2006, the Senate unanimously
passed a bipartisan resolution, which, inter alia, "urges the President to continue
fully supporting Israel as Israel exercises its right of self-defense in Lebanon and
Gaza."15 ' Two days later, the House of Representatives, in a vote of 410 to 8,
expressed unconditional support for "Israel's right to . . . defend itself."15 6 As The
Washington Post reported: "Democratic and Republican congressional leaders are
rushing to offer unalloyed support for Israel's offensive against Hezbollah fighters
.*.."1. Israel enjoyed such overwhelming and bipartisan support in the Congress
that even the Republican descendent of Lebanese family, Darrell Issa, a California
Representative who co-sponsored an alternative resolution, justified his intention
to eventually support the majority bill as follows: "I want to show support for
Israel's right to defend itself" Even at the end of the War, on August 14, 2006
when the Lebanese civilian suffering was known, former President Bush clearly
stated that "we recognize that responsibility for this suffering [civilians on both
sides] lies with Hezbollah. It was an unprovoked attack by Hezbollah on Israel
that started this conflict. Hezbollah terrorists targeted Israeli civilians with daily
rocket attacks." 59
Indeed, some jurists have raised reservations of this blanket support on the
grounds that necessity and, mainly, proportionality (two out of the three accepted
153. Schmitt, supra note 88, at 163. Prof Schmitt even claimed that Israel's 2006 operation "serves
as further evidence of an operational code extending the reach of self-defense to armed attacks
conducted by non-State actors." Id. at 164.
154. Carol Migdalovitz, U.S. Cong. Research Serv., RL 33222, Israel: Background and Relations
With the United States (2008) (emphasis added).
155. S. Res. 534, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c109:S.RES.534:. Cong. S. Res. 534 was passed by a roll call vote. "Condemning Hezbollah
and Hamas and their state sponsors and supporting Israel's exercise of its right to self-defense." Id.
156. H. Res. 921, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted). See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 391, Clerk of
the United States House of Representatives (July 20, 2006), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/
2006/roll391.xml. The text is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:18:./temp/~c
109Zv19Nn.
157. Jim VandeHei, Congress is Giving Israel Vote of Confidence, WASH. POST, July 19, 2006, at
A5.
158. Melissa McNamard, House Passes Pro-Israel Resolution, July 20, 2006 (emphasis added),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/20/politics/mainl820193.shtml.
159. Press Release, White House, President Discusses Foreign Policy During Visit to State
Department (Aug. 14, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases
/2006/08/20060814-3.html.
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criteria of self-defense) 160 were breached. 161  Nevertheless, it seems fair to
conclude that in the context of Israel-U.S. bilateral relations, Israel's CM use, in
and of itself is likely to comply with the legitimate self-defense requirement
appearing in the AECA and the 1952 Agreement.162
Once the basic demand of legitimate "self-defense" was addressed, we are left
with the 1976 Agreement (including the 1978 Notes), which contains three main
criteria to be met: use (a) "in a war"; (b) against "military, fortified targets" and (c)
"against Arab armies."163
2. Did the Second Lebanon War fall under the first criteria "in a war" or-
using the 1978 wording-"special wartime conditions"? 164
First and foremost, it should be noted that even within the legal realm, as
Professor Yoram Dinstein has pointed out, "the term 'war' gives rise to more than
a handful of definitional problems." 65 In the absence of an agreed definition,
serviceable for all purposes, the term currently has little meaning as a legal matter.
We are therefore confined to focusing on the assumed meaning as it evolved
within the context of the end-user agreement.
As the 1978 Notes clarify, the main intention of the American authors of the
document was an International Armed Conflict (IAC) exhibiting high levels of
violence. 166 In fact, great levels of violence or-in the words of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic decision on
jurisdiction-"protracted armed violence" is required in order to initiate the
application of IHL in Non-IAC (NIAC).167
160. The third requirement is immediacy. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 103, 194 (June 27) (Merits); Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 245, 144 (July 8).
161. See Ronen, supra note 152, at 393; STUART MASLEN & VIRGIL WIEBE, CLUSTER MUNITIONS:
A SURVEY OF LEGAL RESPONSES 22-23 (Landmine Action 2008). In contrast, according to Schmitt's
analysis, for instance, "it is self-evident therefore, that, at least vis-d-vis operations designed to stop
rocket attacks, Israeli actions were proportionate (indeed, arguably insufficient)." Schmitt, supra note
88, at 154.
162. See Cloud & Myre, supra note 123.
163. Gwertzman, supra note 47, at 1. It should be noted that NGO reports on Israel's use of CMs
claim that Israel violated the 1976 End-Use Agreement through its widespread and indiscriminate use
of the weapon. See NASH, supra note 19, at 42; MASLEN & WIEBE, supra note 161, at 23. In fact,
Maslen & Wiebe even questioned Israel's compliance with the AECA given the criteria of necessity and
proportionality with respect to "legitimate self-defense." Id. at 22-23.
164. MoYES & NASH, supra note 44, at 9.
165. YoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 15 (Cambridge University Press
2005) (1988).
166. Relying on various Israeli statements during the 1978 crisis, there is a possibility that
following the crisis the 1978 Notes recognized Non-State Arm Groups (NSAG) as regular armies under
certain circumstances but none of the known open sources refers to that. For such a statement by the
then IDF Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur Stated during an interview with the Israeli Press Corps upon his
retirement see Elyeho Agres et al., The Retired Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. "Mota" Gur - Exclusive
Interview to Davar, DAVAR, Apr. 21, 1978, at 19.
167. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
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While the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701168 contains no reference to
the armed conflict qualification, the special U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI)
established by the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) following the four
Rapporteurs reports on their September 2006 fact-finding mission to Lebanon and
Israel 69 was forced to discuss this issue.170 However, due to the issue's sensitivity,
it evaded giving a definitive decision of the conflict's legal classification. Instead,
it stated following:
It is the view of the Commission that hostilities were in actual fact and
in the main only between the IDF and Hezbollah. The fact that the
Lebanese Armed Forces did not take an active part in them neither
denies the character of the conflict as a legally cognizable international
armed conflict, nor does it negate that Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah
were parties to it."
When the war began, however, Israel viewed the Lebanese government
responsible for the unprovoked aggression against it. Within two days, however,
and apparently following U.S. pressure, Israel decided that Hezbollah alone was
responsible for making redundant any discussion of the requirements for
attributing acts of a Non-State Armed Group (NSAG) to states.172 However,
leaving aside the fact that both military and legal experts used the term "war" with
respect to the 2006 "hostilities,"1 73 the important point is the perspectives of the
parties, described in the following.
Israel clearly stated in its identical letters to the UNSG and the Security
Council on July 12, 2006: "Today's act is a clear declaration of war." 174 The IDF
even viewed its operations in Lebanon as an International Armed Conflict
Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
168. S.C. Res. 1701, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006). The term to be used was
"hostilities."
169. See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston; the Special Rapporteur on the Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul
Hunt; the Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons,
Walter Kllin; and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an
Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari: Mission to Lebanon and Israel, 1 11, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/2/7 (Oct. 2, 2006), [hereinafter The Rapporteurs' Rep.]; see also UNHRC, Human rights in
Lebanon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, on his mission to
Lebanon, T 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/8 (Sept. 29, 2006).
170. See UNHRC, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights
Council Resolution S-2/1, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006) [hereinafter The COIs Rep.]. The
qualification was needed as an essential pre-condition for the application of IHL and the establishment
of applicable and governing rules.
171. The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 22, 155 (emphasis added).
172. See Ronen, supra note 152, at 377-79, for an account of Israel's approach regarding Lebanese
responsibility for the July 12 attack before and after the policy's change. See id at 379-84, for an
analysis of whether Lebanon can be held responsible for the attack. See Somer, supra note 151, for a
succinct discussion on requirements regarding the 2006 War.
173. See, e.g., Arkin, supra note 90, at xviii (discussing the military view); Schmitt, supra note 88,
at 157 (discussing the legal view).
174. See July 12, 2006 Letters, supra note 150.
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(IAC). 7 5 A similar view, at least regarding the hostilities' magnitude, seems to
have been shared by the U.S., as former President Bush stated on August 14: "In
Lebanon, Hezbollah declared war on Lebanon's neighbor, Israel, without the
knowledge of the elected government in Beirut."1 76  In fact, in response to a
provocative question on the very day the DTCC's preliminary report was sent to
Congress (January 29, 2007), over whether the U.S. "would allow an agreement
[e.g., the 1976 Agreement] with anybody to [allow use of] cluster bombs against
civilians,"177 State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack replied: ". . .
[O]bviously the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel was one between Hezbollah
and Hezbollah fighters which engaged in an act of aggression against Israel. They
crossed an international border. They started a war. So clearly the conflict was
between those two parties." 7s
Indeed, to the extent that the 1976 Agreement permitted CM use only in an
IAC, Israel's employment of these weapons can be regarded as permissible only if
Lebanon is regarded as a party to the conflict. However, if one applies a strict
interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, even Israel's use of force was
wrongful if Hezbollah's acts cannot be attributed to any state. 179 Nevertheless, as
held by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadid: "[A]n armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups ... "s
This test was recently interpreted by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Haradinaj et al.,
where it focused on two criteria: "protracted armed violence" and
"organization."18
As to the latter criterion-the existence of an organizational structure-
Hezbollah meets this criterion, observed, for instance, in the existence of
headquarters, a command structure, and the ability to obtain access to weapons. 182
Protracted armed violence has been interpreted "as referring more to the intensity
of the armed violence than to its duration."1 83  Reviewing the indicators for
"intensity" as outlined in Haradinaj-such as the number and caliber of munitions
fired or the extent of material destruction-it is clear that the 2006 War fits this
175. See, e.g., The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 62.
176. Press Release, supra note 159.
177. McCormack, supra note 13.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. U.N. Charter art. 51.
180. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1 at 70 (emphasis added).
181. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 37-40, 50-51 (Apr. 3,
2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf.
182. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T at 53. See, e.g., HALA JABER, HEZBOLLAH: BORN WITH A
VENGEANCE 38 (1997), for an overview on the Hezbollah's command structure. For an inside account
on its emergence, training, installations and other aspects raised by the Trial Chamber in the case of
Haradinaj et al., see NAIM QASSEM, HIZBULLAH: THE STORY FROM WITHIN 70-71 (Dalia Khalil trans.,
2005).
183. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T at 149.
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criterion as well. 184
However, it is exactly this preference for the existence of substance (assessing
the conflict's intensity in practice) over a strictly formal approach (the belligerent's
legal status) that characterized Israel's traditional interpretation of the 1976 End-
User Agreement. Within this context, the preference for substance brings us to the
Agreement's implicit requirement for high levels of violence (especially if the 1967
and 1973 Wars serve as precedents).
First and foremost, 3,917 rockets, averaging 100 rockets daily within a 34-day
period, hit Israel's civilian population; on the other side, 173,293 Israeli artillery
projectiles and rockets were fired into South Lebanon, mainly to prevent the
Hezbollah from firing first.85 In addition, the IAF conducted a higher number of
sorties than in the 1973 War-an average of 350 sorties per day. 186 Moreover, it is
perhaps sufficient to recall that in contrast to the heavy attacks on Israel's civilian
population in 2006 (resulting in 43 civilian casualties and thousands of
wounded),1 7 the conduct of the 1956 Sinai War-undoubtedly a classic IAC-
kept Israel's civilian population out of the war.188 Even the IDF's casualty rate,
approximately 50 soldiers, differentiates the two wars; in the 1956 War there were
fewer soldiers injured. 189 Both Israel's civilian and IDF casualties are, of course,
moderate in comparison to the extensive civilian harm caused to the Lebanese and
Hezbollah (1,191 deaths-with as many as 600 deaths of military personnel). 190
Moreover, almost one million Lebanese people were displaced. 191
In sum, while applying the ICTY's criterion for determining the existence of
an armed conflict to the 2006 War demonstrates that this was a classic armed
conflict, the large-scale firepower together with the high level of civilian harm and
casualties on both sides support the claim that the 2006 War was an JAC using a
184. It should be noted that none of the indicative factors is, in itself, essential to establish that the
criterion are satisfied. Id. at 60.
185. Brig. Gen. (Res.) Ya'acov Zigdon, Much Fire, Little Thinking, 420-421 MA'ARACHOT 44, 45-
46 [IDF's OFFICIAL JOURNAL], (Sept. 2008).
186. AMos HAREL & Avi ISSACHAROFF, 34 DAYS: ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH, AND THE WAR IN
LEBANON 292 (2008).
187. The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 178.
188. The then Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, recalled in his memoirs that Egypt's air force limited
its activity to the Sinai Peninsula and only in two cases carried out bombing sorties into Israel; these
resulted in no damage whatsoever. See MOSHE DAYAN, AvNEI DEREKH (MILESTONES - AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY) 280 (1976). This episode is missing from the book's English version, MOSHE
DAYAN, MOSHE DAYAN: STORY OF MY LIFE (1976).
189. During the 1956 War, the IDF suffered 172 causalities; in the 2006 War, the IDF suffered 119
casualties. For data on the 1956 War see, e.g., AVNER YANIV, POLITICS AND STRATEGY IN ISRAEL 142
(1994). For data on the 2006 War see Winograd Final Rep., supra note 99, at 33.
190. The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 11.
191. For the numbers of Lebanese killed or displaced as provided by the Lebanese authorities, see
id.; see also United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR], The Humanitarian Impact
of Cluster Munitions, 29, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/2008/1 (2008). For the high estimate regarding
Hezbollah's casualties, see Kalb & Saivetz, supra note 4, at 48-49 (relying on Israeli sources). The
Winograd Committee mentioned "hundreds" when referring to Hezbollah's casualties. See Winograd
Final Rep., supra note 99, at 33.
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flexible interpretation. As noted by Professor Antonio Cassese: "An armed conflict
which takes place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups -
whether or not they are terrorist in character-in occupied territory, amounts to an
international armed conflict." 192 Even Israel's Supreme Court, acting as the High
Court of Justice (HCJ), in the Targeted Killing case preferred such a flexible
interpretation when classifying the conflict with Palestinian organizations inside
the Occupied Territories as an IAC. 193
With respect to the second criterion (military, fortified targets), it is clear that
whenever the targets were bases, infrastructure or "'areas of dense vegetation, in
which the Hizbullah set up fortified infrastructures (known as 'Nature
Reserves')," 194 this criterion was met.
In contrast, whenever CMs were used against populated areas (e.g., villages)
or within their vicinity -even if deserted-the 1976 Agreement was breached. As
Halutz's statement vis-A-vis unruly ground troops indicates, this was Israel's
utmost concern. After all, the 1978 stipulation is quite clear: "cluster bombs
cannot be used in or adjacent to areas of civilian population." 195 However, given
South Lebanon's population density and Hezbollah's tactic of taking advantage on
the presence of civilian population, 196 it is hard to conceive how Israel could
employ CMs in future actions against Hezbollah while strictly following this
stipulation. In the 2006 War, the IDF organized a plan for evacuating 170
Lebanese villages and employing massive artillery barrages. As recently exposed
in one of the IDF's official journals, "[t]he firing was first directed to the villages'
periphery and after a short pause, to their center." 197 The fact is that CMs are
neither designated to nor capable of harming civilians hiding in bomb shelters.198
Indeed, much can be said on the legality of this act irrespective of its minimal
collateral damage to human life. However, for this Article's purposes, other than
providing an explanation for the gap between Israel's large-scale CM use and the
marginal collateral damage during its firing, it indicates Israel's efforts to bridge
192. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (2d. ed., 2005).
193. See HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of
Israel et al. [2006] IsrSC 53(4) 817, 16-21, translated at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/
690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf [hereinafter Targeted Killing case]. For a different approach calling for
"a mixed legal regime" (international human rights law and IHL) which incorporates features of
international human rights law, see David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-
Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 171, 174 (2005). For a
comprehensive analysis of targeted killing in general, see NILS MELzER, TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5 (2008).
194. See Opinion of the Military Advocate General Regarding Use of Cluster Munitions in Second
Lebanon War, supra note 134.
195. See Wood, supra note 44, at 10.
196. For recent demographic data on South Lebanon, see Lebanese Republic - Presidency Of The
Council ofMinisters, 2007 Stat. Y.B. (Cent. Admin. for Stats.) 9.
197. See Zigdon, supra note 185, at 48.
198. This is a result of the bomblet's low penetration capability given a standard shelter's thick
cement wells.
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the immense gap between the 1978 stipulation and the 2006 reality.199 Israel's
explanation for its breach is already detailed in the MAG's legal opinion.200 In a
nutshell, Israel's extensive use of CMs-which, as the MAG stressed, is "'a legal
weapon which does not inflict superfluous injury on the enemy [i.e., within the
principle of humanity]"- was legal as (1) a concrete military necessity to prevent
rockets being fired at Israel existed and (2) the principles of distinction and
proportionality were maintained because the CMs were fired exclusively at
military targets and then only when it was determined that the potential collateral
damage was not disproportionate to the military advantage gained.201 In practice,
the MAG held the view that excluding one clear deviation and an additional case in
which CMs were used to assist in evacuating forces, 202 CMs were used in
populated areas solely as an immediate defensive response to rocket attacks after
non-combatants were evacuated from these same targets.203 That is, all the uses,
save one, were lawful.
Within the Article's context (i.e., the bilateral end-use agreement), however, it
is important to note that the U.S, which itself has engaged in similar asymmetric
conflicts,204 did realize that following this condition strictly (e.g., not even
targeting "nature reserve" which were build next to populated areas) is tantamount
to depriving Israel from using CM in South Lebanon regardless of the CMs
chosen's HDR. As McCormack stated upon relating to the 1976 Agreement
(January 29, 2007): "It's a fact that they [Hezbollah fighters-EB] used human
shields, that they hid themselves among the civilian populations . . . no military
commander wants to be ... in the position of acting in self-defense and going after
those people who have committed aggressions against your country but are then
hiding among civilian populations." 205 Furthermore, there is a difference between
breaching a basic condition of the Agreement (i.e., employing under a situation far
from being amount to meaningful military conflicts) and breaching a secondary
199. As the Winograd Committee clearly stated: "We should note that we did not hear (sic) any
claims regarding civilian injuries from cluster bombs during the war." See Winograd Final Rep., supra
note 99, at 497. Indeed, even the HRW in its February 2008 comprehensive report counted very few
instances of "time of attack casualties" and therefore focused on 'civilian harm" in the chapter on post-
conflict effects. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 92, at 52. This is not to argue that there were
no civilian casualties from other weapons. For a list of these casualties and details on the incidents
leading to their deaths see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN
LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 62-178, Appendix 11 (2007).
200. See Opinion of the Military Advocate General Regarding Use of Cluster Munitions in Second
Lebanon War, supra note 134. For a concise English summary, see IDF Spokesperson, supra note 138.
201. See id. at 32-39. For a summary of this argument, see also Winograd Final Rep., supra note
99, at 10.
202. In this case, the IDF fired at the Lebanese village of Maroon-A-Ras on July 20th. Halutz
himself justified the use post facto. See Israel News Agency, Israel: Cluster Bombs Used Legally
Against Terrorist Targets (Dec. 26, 2007), http://www.israelnewsagency.com/lebanonwarhizbullah
hezbollahterrorattacksisraelidfclusterbombsdefensekatusha48122607.html.
203. See MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 134, at IT 18-20.
204. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs And Their Use By The United
States In Afghanistan 21-24 (2002) (summarizing reports of cluster strikes in or near populated areas in
Afghanistan).
205. McCormack, supra note 13.
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stipulation within the Agreement's parameters once the use per se is already
permissible.
In sum, we hold the view that given the altered reality and the possibility of
dual use, a careful case-by-case examination is needed. Relying on NGOs' reports
it does seem that there were a few breaches-as Halutz himself admitted.206 It is
clear, however, that under a non-flexible interpretation of this clause-as the Bush
Administration demonstrated-the 1976 Agreement is doomed to be violated in
the next would-be large-scale military conflict in Lebanon.
As such, the third criteria, a "regular army" or "regular forces of a sovereign
nation" in its 1978 wording, becomes highly important. Hezbollah is not a regular
army, and as such, CM use against it apparently constitutes a breach of the 1976
Agreement regardless of its specific targets. However, according to flexible and
purpose-oriented interpretation, the agreements need to be understood "in the light
of present-day conditions."207 Professor Schmitt's comments regarding whether
Israel's 2006 military actions were consistent with criteria for lawful defensive
actions should be adopted, mutatis mutandis, to this case: "[I]nternational law is
dynamic, that if it is to survive, it has to reflect the context in which it is applied as
well as community expectations as to its prescriptive content." 2 08
Many jurists currently hold the view that the traditional distinction between "a
regular army" and a NSAG with respect to various applications of jus ad bellum
and jus in bello should be reconsidered. Interestingly, this view finds much support
in the approach adopted by Israel's high command, when it was engaged in
warfare against NSAGs (armed Palestinian organizations) already during the first
diplomatic crisis (1978), as reflected in the following explanation to Israel's CMs
use by then-IDF Chief of Staff, Gur as follows: 209
Personally, I have no slight doubt that we have not violated the spirit of
the agreement with the Americans. We employed the bombs against
artillery guns, which are weapons of regular armies and not terrorists.
Therefore I haven't seen in the use of these bombs violation in our
agreement with the Americans. In my judgment if we had spoken with
them about artillery firing and Katyushas [Russian weapon which fires
rockets and was widespread among armed Palestinian organizations],
they would have agreed to include the responses to that [the firing] in
206. For such reports, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 90, at 107; NASH, supra note 19, at
36.
207. See Tyrer v. UK, 58 I.L.R. 339, 553 (Eur. Ct. H.R.1978) (wording of the European court of
Human Rights regarding the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222), cited in MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 938
(6th ed., 2009).
208. Schmitt, supra note 88, at 149.
209. For the implications of the NSAG in the current international system see Nicolas Florquin &
Elisabeth Decrey Warner, Engaging Non-State Armed Groups or Listing Terrorists? Implications for
the Arms Control Community, 1 DISARMAMENT FORUM 17, 20 (2008).
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the parameters within we were allowed to employ cluster bombs. 210
Such a flexible interpretation was rendered during the 1982 crisis-even
though Syria's military involvement in the 1982 War was sufficient for Israel to
meet that demand-by presenting the Palestinian forces' large quantity and
sophisticated arms as evidence that supported the CM use criterion regarding
regular armies. As Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv clearly stated in a news conference:
"Cluster bombs and cluster shells were used only against organized resistance,
mainly the Syrians' armor and infantry." 211 Yet, in the 1982 case, it appears that
Israel felt that the military imperatives for employing CMs should override any
externally imposed restrictions. As Ariel Sharon, Israel's then-Minister of Defense
proclaimed: "In wartime it is necessary to interpret formal agreements differently
than in peacetime."212
It has since become much clearer that the distinction between "a regular
army" and an NSAG-perceived as a weaker military force-is superficial.
The implications are that banning some means of warfare by resting on the
formal definition of a national opponent's formal status (independent state or
NSAG) is completely obsolete. Indeed, some jurists do support the U.S.
perspective as recently formulated by a senior State Department official:
The United States hasn't used them [CMs] in the conflicts we're
involved in since 2003 . . . Since then, when you're fighting a
counterinsurgency, which is what's happening in both Afghanistan and
Iraq, I think our military planners would agree with you completely that
they 're not appropriate and wouldn't be very useful.213
Nevertheless, Hezbollah's conduct and capabilities-such as firing 3,917
rockets within 34 days of war214 -led many military experts to perceive its
campaign "as a major departure from the asymmetric methods of traditional
terrorists or guerrillas and as a shift toward the conventional military methods
normally associated with state actors." 215 As stated in the Targeted Killing ruling:
210. Stated during an interview with the Israeli Press Corps upon his retirement, see Agres et al.,
supra note 166. Gur explained to the foreign press on that occasion that CMs were used "only in a very
few cases, and then against artillery [positions], in accordance with the spirit of our agreement with the
US." See Milan J. Kubic, The Cluster Bomb Furor, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 1978, at 50. The issue's
sensibility is reflected in the total absence of Gur's (censored) memoirs regarding this period. See
MORDECHAI GUR, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (1974-1978) ch. 7 (1998).
211. Use of Cluster Bombs Is Confirmed by Israel, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1982, at A8 (emphasis
added).
212. After being questioned on this issue during a meeting with a delegation of six Congressmen
headed by Nick Rahall (D-VA) during their ten-day visit to the region in late July 1982. See Nick J.
Rahall II, Lebanon and U.S. Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East, 2 AM.-ARAB AFF. 40, 45 (Fall
1982).
213. Mull, supra note 145.
214. See Zigdon, supra note 185, at 46.
215. Stephen Biddle, & Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign And The Future Of
Warfare: Implications For Army And Defense Policy 5 (2008). As this study by the U.S. Army War
College concludes "[i]n all, then, Hezbollah's behavior in 2006 conformed to neither an ideal model of
'guerrilla' warfare nor one of 'conventional' war fighting, but its approach and proficiency nonetheless
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"Indeed, in today's reality, a terrorist organization is likely to have considerable
military capabilities. At times they have military capabilities that exceed those of
states."216 As a case in point, Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), proscribed as a terrorist organizationby 32 states, has its own air and
naval forces.217 Therefore, given the altered reality, this Article strongly suggests
that the distinction between "a regular army" and an NSAG vis-A-vis their
attributed military strength and the appropriate means to be used in combat-
should be re-considered.
It should be noted, however, that while the 1976 Agreement's conditions
focusing on the adversaries' firepower justified addressing the 2006 War as an IAC
and Hezbollah as an organization akin to a regular army, the issue currently at
hand is whether Hezbollah's guerrilla tactics justify the employment of CMs
against them. Nevertheless, the 1978 clarifications give the impression that their
U.S. authors were preoccupied with the adversaries' firepower as a threat to
Israel's security. Hence, the open question regarding the adversaries' tactics
should have but a limited effect on the conclusion as to whether this End-User
Agreement was breached.
Because not all U.S. Administrations can be expected to be as favorably
inclined toward Israel as was the Bush Administration was it is likely that they
may confine themselves to a formal and strict approach to the Agreement's
interpretation. Therefore, it is interesting to assess whether Israel can invoke the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in light of a strict legal interpretation. It should be
emphasized, however, that the following discussion has no practical implication
given the rather intense patron-client relationship, such an Israeli move is unlikely,
a prior.2 18
As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the 1973 Fisheries
Jurisdiction case:
place it well within a band that has characterized many past state militaries in interstate conflicts." Id. at
XV.
216. Targeted Killing case, supra note 193, at 21 (Decision written by Aharon Barak, then
President of the Israeli Supreme Court).
217. See, e.g., Sumantra Bose, CONTESTED LANDS: ISRAEL-PALESTINE, KASHMIR, BOSNIA,
CYPRUS, AND SRI LANKA 6, 27-28, 35, 41 (2007) (discussing the LTTE's military capabilities).
However, in January 2009 the Government initiated a major military offensive which forced the LTTE
to give up much of their territory. By January 25, the Sri Lankan army "had captured" the town of
Mullaitivu, the last major LTTE stronghold-a move which brings an increasing belief that the final
military defeat of the LTTE is near or, at least, "signal[s] the end of conventional battles." See, e.g.,
Somini Sengupta, Troops Take A Town Held By Rebels In Sri Lanka, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2009, at A9;
Emily Wax, Sri Lankan Leader Says Tamil Rebels Nearly Defeated, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2009, at A10.
On February 21, despite the LTTE desperate military situation, its air force, the "Air Tigers" launched a
surprise air attack (its 10th since the first one in March 2007) on Sri Lanka's capital, Colombo, in what
observers described as "a defiant show of power." Emily Wax, Rebel Air Attack Kills 3 in Sri Lankan
Capital-One Plane Crashes, 2nd is Shot Down, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2009, at AO.
218. For the diplomatic and intellectual history of this doctrine, see David J. Bederman, The 1871
London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View on the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1, 2-4 (1988).
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International law admits that a fundamental change in the circumstances
which determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a
radical transformation of the extent of the obligations imposed by it,
may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for
invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty.219
While the observation that "this Convention has since its conclusion been the
source of much and angry discussion between the two Governments" referred to
the 1865 U.S.-Britain Clayton Bulwer Treaty in which the U.S. attempted to
revoke the doctrine, the same description could easily apply to the 1976 End-User
Agreement as well. 220 In addition, one may notice that Israel was forced to consent
to the treaty's stipulations. Historically, it should be remembered, the element of
coercion has been responsible for states resorting to this doctrine, especially
between the two world wars. 2 2 1
Nevertheless, Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,222 which represents the customary law on this issue, 223 includes strict
conditions which have to be met in order for such a radical claim be accepted.224
In fact, in the two cases this claim was raised before the ICJ, it was rejected.225
Clearly, the burden of proof is heavy, and rightly so given that the "doctrine is an
important but limited exception to the foundational principle of pacta sunt
servanda."226 Professor Vagts, in summarizing the doctrine's status as of 2005
notes: "rebus sic stantibus will not avail unless the change of circumstances is
clearly a drastic change from the circumstances anticipated by the parties."227
Given such a heavy burden, it is indeed difficult to determine how Israel
could invoke this doctrine, particularly because prior to the agreement's conclusion
in December 1976, but mainly in the subsequent period (i.e., up to the 1978 Litani
Operation), rockets were fired into Israel from South Lebanon by Palestinian
22organizations.228 The 2006 Hezbollah rocket attacks were indeed much more
extensive and penetrating (rockets reached as far south as Haifa, Israel's third
219. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 19 (Feb. 2). The Court repeated this stance
following 25 years in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 63-4 (Sept. 25).
220. For the citation as well as a brief overview of this historic case, see Vagts, supra note 20, at
467 (quoting Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties 521 (1961)). It should be noted, however, that
following a strong Britain resistance the U.S. dropped its claim. Id.
221. See id. at 468.
222. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 62, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
223. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 219, at 18; see also SHAW, supra note 207, at 496.
224. For the five accumulated conditions, see Reports ofthe Commission to the General Assembly,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 259, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1.
225. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1973 I.C.J. at 19; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 38-39.
226. Mark Bennett & Nicole Roughan, Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Treaty of Waitangi, 37
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 505, 513 (2006).
227. Vagts, supra note 20, at 475.
228. For such attacks, see, e.g., Raymond H. Anderson, Cairo Reports an Israeli Jet Hit, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1970, at 9; Chronologies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1973, at 3; Israeli Planes Strike 2
Palestinian Areas at Beirut After Theater Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1974, at 12.
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largest city). Yet, even these did not amount to meeting the requirement of "a
fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty." 229  Furthermore, the
"fundamental change of circumstances" must not be "foreseen by the
parties." 230 Gur, however, stated in the wake of the 1978 crisis: "In my judgment,
if we had spoken with them [the U.S.] about artillery and Katyushas, they would
have agreed to include responses to them."231 However, the 1978 clarifications
indeed contained no revisions regarding the rocket threat imposed by NSAGs in
Lebanon, and as such it is hard to claim, given the opportunity to amend the
agreement in April 1978, that rocket attacks had not been foreseen by Israel.
In concluding this issue, a flexible and object-oriented method of
interpretation, according to which the formally classified End-User Agreement is
interpreted "in the light of present-day conditions,"232 enables us to claim that the
use of CMs in the 2006 War per se (as distinct from a few specific cases of
improper use) does not constitute the treaty's violation. As to the Bush
Administration, the January 2007 internal debate over whether Israel should be
penalized for using CMs "against towns and villages where Hezbollah had placed
its rocket launchers" perhaps indicates that many U.S. Administration officials
have adopted just such an interpretation.233 In the absence of a formal acceptance
of this stance, given Israel's inability-politically and legally-to invoke the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the 1976 Agreement is doomed to be violated again
in the next large-scale military encounter with Hezbollah. For many Israelis, a
situation in which the entire northern part of the country is paralyzed due to the
threat of rockets is tantamount to or even worse than a Syrian limited offensive
operation designated to retake the Golan Heights.234 Although such a subjective
perception will not be upheld by any international court, it does explain why-as a
senior U.S. official stated regarding the 2006 employment of CMs-"[f]rom their
perspective, use of the munitions was clearly done within the agreements."235
B. Possible Lesssons for the CCM
In November 2006, when the CCW Third Review Conference convened, the
issue of CMs was not on the agenda, with most observers doubtful that it would
attract much attention.236 In the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War (July-
229. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 222, at art. 62(1).
230. Id.
231. See Agres et al., supra note 166.
232. SHAW, supra note 207, at 348-49 (discussing Loizidou v. Turkey, 103 ILR 622).
233. While some U.S. officials contended that Israel violated U.S. prohibitions when using CMs
against populated areas, others argued that Israel used these arms in self-defense to stop Hezbollah's
rocket attacks, which would amount to a "technical violation" at most. See Buncombe, supra note 123;
Cloud & Myre, supra note 123; News Agencies, supra note 123.
234. For the heavy economic costs, see, e.g., Winograd Final Rep., supra note 99, at 5.
235. The official is John Hillen, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs in the
Bush administration (2005-2007), cited in Benhorin, supra note 129; Cloud & Myre, supra note 123.
236. John Borrie, The Road from Oslo: Emerging International Efforts on Cluster Munitions, 85
Disarmament Dipl., Summer 2007, at 85.
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August 2006), however, banning or heavily restricting the use of CMs-with
strong encouragement by the ICRC 237 and the Cluster Munition Coalition
(CMC) 238-secured a high place on the agenda.239 Nonetheless, a call by 25 states,
led by Norway, to ban CMs "that pose serious humanitarian hazards because they
are, for example, unreliable and/or inaccurate," 240 did not achieve a consensus. It
was ultimately decided to convene a meeting of experts in June 2007 to further
consider the application and implementation of existing IHL "to specific munitions
that may cause explosive remnants of war, with particular focus on cluster
munitions."241
And so in June 2007, four months after 46 states agreed to launch the "Oslo
Process" and endorse the Oslo Declaration, which committed them to conclude an
instrument to ban CMs by late 2008,242 Germany submitted a draft Protocol VI on
CMs. 24 3  The draft included prohibitions and restrictions on the storage,
destruction, and transfer of CMs between countries but fell far short of the
prohibitions contained in the CCM.24 4  In brief, the Draft Protocol sought to
prevent significant post-conflict civilian harm in future conflicts involving
employment of CMs due to the availability of new cluster bombs with a negligible
237. ICRC personnel were shocked by Israel's extensive use of CMs. As the ICRC's Director for
International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri, later (2007) stated, "[T]he density of cluster
submunition contamination may be unprecedented," cited in United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, supra note 191, at 30, 61.
238. The CMC-a group of about 300 NGOs from more than 80 countries-was formed after the
2003 Dublin Conference on ERW. For more on the CMC, see Cluster Munition Coalition,
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/.
239. For more details on the 2006 War's contribution to the CCM's emergence, see John Borrie,
The 'Long Year': Emerging International Efforts to Address the Humanitarian Impacts of Cluster
Munitions, 2006-2007, 10 Y.B. OF INT'L. HUMANITARIAN L. 251, 258-60 (2007).
240. Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 7-17, 2006, Final Document, 41,
U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.III/1 1, Part III.
241. Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 7-17, 2006, Final Declaration, 6,
U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.III/1 1, Part II.
242. Olso Conference on Cluster Munitions, Oslo, Nor., Feb. 22-23, 2007, Declaration, T 1,
available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/Oslo%/ 20DeclarationFeb07.pdf.
243. See Group of Gov'tl Experts of the States Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or
Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva, Switz., June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW Protocol on
Cluster Munitions, 1, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP. 1 (May 2007). The proposed Protocol joins three
initial protocols and two Protocols which were adopted later: Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
(Protocol I), Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, amended by 35
I.L.M. 1206 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1998); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171; Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF .i/7 (Oct. 12, 1995); and Protocol on
Explosive Remnants of War, May 16, 2006, U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2003/2.
244. See Draft Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 5-6.
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HDR (less than one percent).245 This state of affairs should, however, become
effective only after a long transition period (8 years, with the Protocol's optional
extension for an additional four years) after its entry into effect.246 In the interim
period, use of "old-generation"' CMs was allowed due to a few loosely structured
conditions, such as approval by "[the] highest-ranking operational commander in
the area of operations or by the appropriate politically mandated operational
authority, in accordance with its national procedures."247
In November 2007, at the CCW State Parties annual meeting, a consensus
was achieved to "negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact
of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian
considerations."248 However, no agreed text on CMs was completed during the
five sessions held by the CCW's Group of Governmental Experts (GGE, the expert
249subsidiary body of the CCW) on CMs in 2008. Yet, the CCW State Parties, in
their November 2008 annual meeting, decided to continue work into 2009, while
setting aside two 2009 GGE sessions to address the CM weapons issue.250
Nonetheless, no agreed text was completed even in 2009 and in their November
2009 annual meeting, CCW State Parties decided to continue negotiation in 2010.251
245. See id. at art. 4, 2(b). Alternatively, employing CM weapons under the proposed Draft
Protocol is permissible once they possess at least one effective safeguard "that must effectively ensure]
with a high degree of reliability that unexploded submunitions will no longer function as explosive
submunitions" such as self-destruction mechanisms, self-deactivating features or self-neutralization
mechanisms. Id. at T 2(a).
246. Id. at art. 4 3. As expected, this point which in the Protocol's earlier drafts ranged up to 15
years has drawn heavy criticism by CCM supporters who hold the view that "the 13-20 year deferral is
designed to permit continued use of the weapon during that time." Steve Goose, Co-Chair, CMC, CMC
Statement on Article 4, Gen. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions (Nov. 3, 2008), available at
www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/ 11/ccw-art-4-11308.pdf.
247. Draft Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 4, 4(a).
248. Meeting of the High Contract'g Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or Restrict'ns on the
Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have
Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 7-13, 2007 Report, 37, U.N. Doc CCW/MSP/2007/5 (Dec. 3,
2007). A draft mandate to begin negotiations on this Protocol was submitted by Germany on behalf of
the European Union in June 2007. See Group of Gov'tl Experts of the States Parties to the Convent'n on
Prohibit'ns or Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva, Switz., June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW
Negotiating Mandate on Cluster Munitions.
249. See Group of Gov'tl Experts of the States Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or
Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscrim. Effects, Procedural Report, 1 13, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE/2008-V/2
(Nov. 14, 2008).
250. Two sessions specifically addressing CMs were scheduled for 2009. See Meeting of the High
Contract'g Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l
Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva,
Switz., Nov. 13-14, 2008, Report 34, U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2008/4, (Jan. 23, 2009). See also Jeff
Abramson, CCWFails to Reach Cluster Munitions Pact, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec., 2008, at 48.
251. After prolonged futile discussions even on the point whether it is a protocol or a proposal for
protocol it was agreed that the GGE "will conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and report to
the next Meeting of the High Contracting Parties", while two sessions were scheduled (Apr. 12-16 and
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Critics of this attempt to address CM use under the auspices of the CCW have
raised doubts whether such a protocol could ensure the prevention of a
humanitarian crisis similar to that witnessed in South Lebanon.252 Those critics,
mainly CCM supporters, view the attempt as a means to undermine the CCM253
and forestall the weapon's nascent stigmatization, which they had hoped the CCM
would generate.254 Moreover, they are concerned that, while the CCM seeks to
delegitimize this weapon, the protocol's would-be effect can be expected to have
polar results. Hence, the extensive CM use in the Second Lebanon War appears to
provide an important lesson on what the preferable option in this still theoretical
dilemma between banning and regulating the weapon should be. As this Article
argues, a bilateral End-Use Agreement confronts Israel with severe restrictions vis-
A-vis the use of CMs. Importantly, these restrictions are much more stringent and
specific than the general principles incorporated in the CM Draft Protocol for the
purpose of preventing future IHL violations associated with employment of
CMs. 255
On the one hand, approximately 4,000 thousand rockets descended on Israel's
civil population (an average of 100 rockets daily); on the other hand, more than
173,000 artillery projectiles and rockets were fired on South Lebanon, whatever
their aim. In retrospect, it was almost unavoidable that Israel would resort to CMs
despite the stringent restrictions of the 1976 End-User Agreement. As the 2006
War strongly suggests, despite Israel's unique bilateral and legally binding
commitment, when it comes to restraining the use of CM weapons in a bitter
Aug.30-Sept.3). See Katherine Harrison, Landmine Action Notes on CCW, Nov. 14, 2009 (unpublished
Note, on file with Author). As of late November no official report is available.
252. For a critical review, article by article, of an earlier, slightly modified version (July 2008) of
the CCW Draft Protocol, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH OBSERVATIONS ON THE
CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) DRAFT PROTOCOL ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS 1, 6
(2008) [hereinafter HRW, OBSERVATIONS ON WEAPONS], available at http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2008/09/02/globall9723.htm.
253. As 25 CCW State Parties, mainly strong supporters of the Oslo Process, stated during the
November 2008 session of the GGE upon objecting the proposed draft protocol, "...by allowing states
to choose from a menu of vaguely-worded options . . . it [the Chair's text] could be used as a
justification for the continued use of cluster munitions that have already proven over the past decades to
cause exactly the humanitarian consequences that we are trying to address. For these reasons, the
Chair's text as it stands is not acceptable to our delegations." For their joint statement see John Borrie,
CCW: The Wailing Wall, http://disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com/2008/11/ccw-wailing-wall.html
(Nov. 6, 2008) (as it was read into the record; no formal reference is available).
254. For a recent overview on this process with respect to a range of war instruments, see BRIAN
RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND THE CONVENTION: STIGMA, HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS AND THE
OSLO PROCESS 2-4 (Landmine Action 2008). See also, Michedl Martin, Ir. Foreign Minister, Closing
Ceremony at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions (May 30, 2008), available at
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/Ireland.pdf ("[Elven though we all know that there are
important states not present, I am also convinced that together we will have succeeded in stigmati[z]ing
any future use of cluster munitions.").
255. See Draft Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 3 (protecting civilians, civilian population and
civilian objects). As expected, the HRW who reviewed the July 2008 draft, which was detailed and
much harsher than the later drafts, found "serious shortcomings with this article." HRW,
OBSERVATIONS ON WEAPONS, supra note 252, at 4. Eventually, all the paragraphs that represented new
law and were critiqued by HRW have been deleted and the latest draft simply reiterates existing IHL.
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conflict, no state is to be trusted, especially given the vague and loose restrictions
characterizing the current draft proposal.
Unlike anti-personnel mines, for instance, CMs are still perceived by modem
militaries as an effective weapon:25 6 "They ... provide distinct advantages against
a range of targets . . . ." Hence, if CMs remain part of an army's arsenal
irrespective of the protocol's final stringency, it may be doomed-like the 1976
End-Use Agreement-to be violated.
Given the large number of possessor states, massive use of CMs may just be a
matter of time, subject to a country's involvement in a bitter conflict. Only the
total elimination of CMs as legitimate weapons can prevent the recurrence of the
2006 tragedy.
Historically, banning a weapon has not ensured its total elimination.258
Regardless of the intrusiveness of the legal instrument applied, states can always
develop and/or maintain a hidden arsenal.259 Banning does guarantee, however,
that the banned weapon is, at minimum, outside the reach of regular combat units
when a bitter conflict does erupt, a restriction making it impossible for the alleged
arsenal to be used other than as a last resort. That being the case, the salient
question-underestimated by many CCM state supporters which are free from
grave security concerns-remains as to whether there are appropriate alternatives
to the military advantages offered by CMs.
V. CONCLUSION
While reading this Article, one may notice a sharp discrepancy between U.S.
expressions of the CM's unquestionable legitimacy and the heavy restrictions
imposed on Israel regarding its use. After all, notwithstanding U.S. practice
(resorting to this weapon in most of the conflicts in which it was involved), only in
256. For discussion on the limited military utility attributed to AP mines see, e.g., Robert G. Gard,
Jr., The Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines, in To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement To
Ban Landmines 136, 140-41, 143, 154 (Maxwell A. Cameron et al. eds., 1998).
257. Memorandum from Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, for Sec'ys of the Military Dep't
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Sec'y of Defense for Acquisition, Tech. and Logistics Under
Sec'y of Defense for Policy Commanders of the Combatant Commands Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of
Defense (June 19, 2008) (announcing a new U.S. policy on CMs), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf. In principle, the new policy (June 19, 2008)
sets the goal of using CMs with less than one percent HDR within the next ten years.
258. See Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin, Ir.,
May 19-30, 2008, Convention on Cluster Munitions, art. 1(b). Note that Article 3(6) permits possession
of a limited number of CMs and explosive sub-munitions for the development of and training in CM
and explosive sub-munition detection, clearance, or destruction, and development of CM
countermeasures. See id. at art. 3(6).
259. As Ken Alibek, a.k.a. Kanatjan Alibekov, former deputy head of Biopreparat, the Soviet
Union's bio-weapons program, and President of Advanced Biosystems, Inc., wrote in his book's
prologue, "[o]ver a twenty-year period that began, ironically, with Moscow's endorsement of the
Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] in 1972, the Soviet Union built the largest and most advanced
biological warfare establishment in the world." KEN ALIBEK WITH STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIOHAzARD
X (1999). It should be noted that the Soviet Union is one of the three BWC depository states.
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June 2008 did the U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates state that: "Cluster
munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They are effective
weapons ... an integral part of U.S... . capabilities." 260 Five months later, during
the November 2008 session of the GGE on CMs, after CCM supporters succeeded
to thwart the U.S. efforts to conclude a draft protocol at that session, it hurried to
clarify that: "On the 4th of December, after the signing ceremony of Oslo, cluster
munitions will still remain as lawful and legitimate weapons."261
Yet, if CMs are such "legitimate" and "lawful" weapons, why has the U.S.
chosen to single out this means of warfare for specific use restrictions from among
the vast variety of weapons it has supplied to Israel over the years? Why does the
general legislation that applies to all U.S.-made weapons (the 1952 Mutual
Agreement and the 1976 AECA) not apply to CMs? After all, albeit the 1976
Agreement's stipulations and its willingness to engage with Israel over this
weapon, the US. has singled out CMs as special weapons requiring high military
thresholds before they can be operated. CMs therefore appear to represent an
intermediate level between "regular" conventional weapons and WVMD.
Furthermore, while the 1976 Agreement's birth can be explained within the
context of the specific type of CM involved (i.e., FAEs, which continue to cause
much concern in the international community), it remains difficult to accounts for
the U.S.'s prolonged concern over Israel's use of CMs. Given its diplomatic battle
with CCM supporters' over stigmatization of the weapon, the U.S decision to
confront Israel over CMs use in the 2006 War was highly counterproductive.
As research on weapon stigmatized has shown, "[s]ingling out certain
weapons or classes of weapon from the rest" is the first step in "differentiating
them from other means of force that result in death and injury." 262
Sincere U.S. concern over possible harm to the Arab civilian population can
provide but a partial explanation in the face of numerous incidents where massive
collateral damage resulted from Israel's use of U.S.-made weapons other than
CMs. In many cases, the U.S. remained Israel's staunch ally, laboring to "protect"
Israel from possible sanctions by the international community. 263
260. Gates, supra note 257.
261. Stephen Mathias, Head of U.S. Delegation, U.S. Delegation Statement on Proposed Changes
by Group of 25 (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ccwtreaty.com/statements/1107Group25.html.
262. Rappert, supra note 254, at 18.
263. On November 8, 2006, for instance, 19 civilians were killed and 40 were wounded from
155mm HE U.S.-made shells fired by the IDF one day after the formal end of Operation Autumn
Clouds in Beit Hanoun, Gaza Strip. Three days later, the U.S. vetoed a draft resolution by Qatar
deploring, inter alia, Israel's military actions in Gaza and calling for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Gaza Strip. See S.C., U.N. SCOR 5565th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5565 (Nov. 11, 2006)
(10 in favor with 4 abstentions). It should be noted that after another six days, on November 17, a
similar draft resolution was adopted in a General Assembly emergency session, with a recorded vote of
156 in favor and 7 against, with 6 abstentions. See U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 10th emergency special
plen., U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.19, (Nov. 17, 2006). See also, Press Release, General Assembly, By Wide
Margin, General Assembly Emergency Session Adopts Text Deploying Israeli: Military Actions in
Gaza, Calling for Dispatch of UN Mission to Beit Hanoun, GA/10534 (Nov. 17, 2001).
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A better explanation was provided-indirectly-by the IDF Attach6 to the
U.S. during the 1976 Agreement's formulation. Brig. Gen. Abraham "Bren" Aden,
when referring to the sanctions imposed on Israel by the U.S. following Israel's
"use of cluster bombs against terrorists in Lebanon," preferred not to blame the
various U.S. administrations but, rather, "U.S. public opinion, which perceives it as
a 'dirty' weapon ....
Such an explanation could also account for the highly forgiving manner in
which the Bush Administration approached Israel's use in 2006 of U.S.-made CMs
despite its extensiveness, especially in contrast to its 1982 use, for which Israel,
too, was punished. First, if this explanation is correct, the Administration
realized-as reflected in the overwhelming support Israel rallied in Congress-that
US public opinion was much more inclined at the time to consent to Israeli
employment of U.S.-made CMs. A probable reason for this support was the
absence of Palestinians (especially Palestinian refugee camps) in the conflict as
opposed to those presented as Iran's Proxy: Hezbollah. Second, given the dearth
of significant domestic pressures to treat CM use seriously, the Administration
may have realize that against its diplomatic campaign to forestall CMS
stigmatization, any sanctions against Israel would be tantamount to admitting the
virtue of CCM supporters' claims.265
However, looking beyond U.S.-Israel bilateral relations, one may notice that
when Israel's top echelons underestimated U.S. sensitivity to its End-User
Agreement-as recent Israeli war literature indicates-they had good reason.266
264. See Abraham Aden, The US Assistance to IDF Arming, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND
ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY 1979-1988 129 (Zeev Klein ed. 1988) (emphasis added). Aden served as
the IDF Attach6 to the U.S during 1974-77. He himself questioned the pros and cons of Israel's
dependence in US military aid. Id.
265. For the intensive Bush Administration's diplomatic efforts to forestall the CCM's initiation,
see, e.g., Kim Murphy, Britain Deals a Setback to U.S.; Brown Overrules his Military and Joins in
Cluster Bomb Ban, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at Al. On the magnitude of the battle in which the Bush
Administration was forced to engage, see Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 2008, All. ("At least this treaty, like the land-mine ban, will stigmatize cluster munitions and make it
harder to use them.") (commenting on the Bush Administration's strong opposition to the CCM).
266. It turned out, for instance, that upon receiving the MLRSs in the late 1990s, Israel was
obligated to submit a quarterly report on their use, which was limited to war use. During the War,
however, former IDF Military Attach6 to the U.S., Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, was instructed to repel
possible U.S. queries over MLRS use by noting that Israel would submit a report on its 2006 use as
usual, in its year-end quarterly report-a clear indication that the IDF high command underestimated
the issue's effect on U.S.-Israel relations. See OFER SHELAH & YOAv LIMOR, CAPTIVES OF LEBANON
159 (2007). A second indication is the fact that wartime Minister of Defense, Amir Peres was not
informed on that use until the War ended as his political adviser's testimony indicates. See Eldar, supra
note 1, at 24. Indeed, this testimony contradicts a formal statement his office released on Nov. 22, 2006.
According to the Hebrew version Peretz himself stated that "during the fighting, Peretz had been
informed that the IDF used cluster bombs" and that-as the statement reads- he demanded an
explanation and was told that the IDF was abiding by all international agreements and treaties. See
Rapoport, Peretz's Office Admits 'Irregularities, supra note 7; Rapoport, A Testimony, supra note 108.
Nonetheless, as it was released a day after Halutz's surprising announcement its timing suggests that
Peretz's formal statement was meant to address the 1978 demand that field commanders not employ
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Given the reports on large-scale civilian harm in Iraq following heavy American
use of similar weapons during the 1993 Gulf War, it is doubtful that the U.S.
applied the same very strict limitations it imposed on Israel upon itself.267 Hence,
the U.S. persecution of Israel for its 2006 use of CM weapons is "somewhat
hypocritical." 268 "If you look at the American use of force in Iraq against civilian
targets, Israel is a far cry from that," explained an Israeli scholar in his assessment
that no sanctions against Israel were expected in January 2007.269 Indeed, Israel's
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson has stressed that "if NATO countries stock these
weapons and have used them in recent conflicts-in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and
Iraq-the world has no reason to point a finger at Israel."270
As a recent in-depth study of U.S. treaty behavior found, "[t]here is
bewilderment at the inconsistency and unreliability that seem to characterize the
United States' attitudes and actions toward international agreements." 27 1  U.S.
practices regarding employment of CMs in conflicts in which it has participated
during the last 27 years since the last crisis over this issue (1982)--e.g., Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq-have signaled anything but care and concern over the
improper use of the weapon.272
these weapons "without a decision by politically responsible superiors." Oberdorfer, supra note 30.
267. On the use in Iraq, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 5, 7 (2003). See also Karen Hulme, Of Questionable Legality: The
Military Use of Cluster Bombs in Iraq in 2003, 42 CAN. Y. INT'L L. 143, 144 (2004). The attack on
Nadir on Mar. 31, 2003, for instance, with CMs resulted in 38 civilians killed and 156 injuries. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 85-87.
268. See Meron Rapoport, What Lies Beneath, HAARETz, Sept. 8, 2006, at Bi.
269. Prof Eitan Gilboa, as quoted in Teibel, supra note 133.
270. The spokesman, Mark Regev, as cited in Ina Friedman, Deadly Remnants, THE JERUSALEM
REP. Nov. 13, 2006, at 20. In addition, Israeli officials view much of the criticism on Israel found in
NGO reports as biased and betraying dual standards. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch's, Cluster
Munitions Report: Under The Faqade (NGO Monitor Rep.) Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/hrw-s-cluster munitions report under the fa ade.
271. Antonia Chayes, How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security, 33 INT'L SEC.
45, 45 (2008).
272. A reflection of this can be found in a recent NGO's report over various incidents of CM use
since 1997. The report discussed the 2006 Lebanon case following a discussion of the NATO attack on
Nis, Serbia in May 1999, although it is unclear whether U.S. or Dutch planes dropped the CMs that
caused the civilian harm. See MASLEN & WIEBE, supra note 161, at 15-18. On cluster strikes in or near
populated areas in Afghanistan, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 204, at 1-4.
